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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
During previous decades, the rapid growth and high performance of the private 
equity (PE) sector have attracted several academic researchers to investigate the 
rising phenomenon. Many scholars have argued that the PE ownership model 
enables PE firms to run portfolio companies in a superior manner, resulting in 
outperformance over the public market and justifying the high fees of general 
partners (GPs) (Morris 2014). However, little is known about how GPs create value 
in their portfolio companies, and especially, whether the outperformance is 
achieved through incremental leverage, valuation multiple growth or operational 
improvements in portfolio companies. So far, insufficient value creation 
frameworks and unavailability of deal-level data prevented scholars from studying 
value creation with a precision that would answer these questions. Furthermore, 
some previous studies are based upon data whose reliability has recently been 
questioned, creating a need for re-evaluating PE performance (Harris et al. 2014b). 
 
In addition to the high performance of the industry, top-quartile PE funds have 
found to outperform bottom quartile funds by 7 to 8% annually (Korteweg & 
Sorensen 2017) and generate IRR above 50% (Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 2011). Thus, 
the measurement of value creation has risen into a key role for limiter partners (LPs) 
to identify the top-performing funds of the future. However, the increasing 
competition has caused fund performance persistence to vanish after 2000 (Harris 
et al. 2014a), causing the failure of LPs to identify future top performers (Sensoy et 
al. 2014). The lack of persistence at fund-level has raised the need of finding better 
predictors of future performance (Braun et al. 2017b).  
 
The limitations of fund-level persistence research, such as the overlap of precedent 
funds, low-frequency data and significant lag of performance information (Braun 
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et al. 2017b), blurs the view of GPs’ actual value creation, leaving little investable 
persistence (Korteweg & Sorensen 2017). Furthermore, fund-level studies fail to 
identify whether specific GPs have a skill to create persistent value with a particular 
value creation driver. If such persistent skills emerged, these could be used as better 
predictors of GPs’ future performance, thus offering better chances for LPs to 
identify top-performing funds, and to foster fund inflows to GPs that truly earn their 
fees.  
1.2 Research objective and questions 
The objective of this study is to shed light on the value creation and persistence of 
private equity investments. By utilizing a rarely accessible deal-level dataset and a 
sophisticated methodology, we aim to improve understanding of value creation in 
the private equity industry. By dividing value creation into various sources and 
causes, we aim to answer the primary research question: 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠? 
 
Since private equity funds have found to outperform public markets gross-of-fees, 
it is interesting to examine how the GPs create these excess returns. We aim to 
quantify the abnormal value creation of private equity investments with various 
drivers to identify how expected outperformance is achieved.  
 
𝐻𝑜𝑤 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠? 
 
After understanding how value is created on average, we aim to study whether 
historical value creation provides valuable information for LPs when considering 
future investment opportunities. We aim to quantify the predictive value of 
historical performance to improve our understanding of the persistence of different 
value creation drivers.  
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𝐻𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠? 
 
In addition to understanding the persistence of various value creation drivers in 
general, we will examine the differences in value creation attribution between GPs. 
Thus, we aim to understand whether certain GPs can create value at particular value 
creation levers consistently, indicating a skill that can be turned into value from a 
deal to another. We will examine the persistence of various value creation drivers, 
and especially, the ability of GPs to create outperforming value through various 
sources. 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑃𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟  
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠? 
1.3 Research design, methodology and scope 
1.3.1 Research design and methods 
This thesis will consist of theoretical and empirical parts. First, a comprehensive 
literature review is introduced around the topic to offer a general understanding of 
the PE sector and especially to summarize the results of previous research in the 
areas of value creation and performance persistence. While the previous studies do 
not offer results at the same level of detail as we do, they will provide a solid basis 
for our study as well as a way to connect our results to the general understanding of 
PE value creation.  
 
The empirical part of the thesis will be constructed to answer the research questions 
of the thesis. We will use a deal-level dataset to study the value creation at the level 
of an individual portfolio company. As far as we know, we will be the first to exploit 
the IVC 2.0 value creation framework introduced by Zeisberger et al. (2017) as the 
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tool to quantify the value creation of private equity deals. In addition to quantifying 
the value contribution of particular value creation drivers, their long term 
persistence will be studied both in general and within specific GPs. 
1.3.2 Data sources 
Several data sources are needed to gather the necessary information for calculating 
value creation according to IVC 2.0 framework. Perhaps the most valuable data is 
the rarely accessible deal-level dataset of private equity transactions. We received 
the dataset from a fund-of-fund, which used it as a part of a due diligence process 
to evaluate the GPs’ value creation abilities.  
 
Another significant contributor to the results of this thesis was the public company 
data used to compare each transaction to industry peers. We collected the necessary 
financial information of public companies from the Capital IQ database. Tax rates 
were collected from a database of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). To estimate the cost of debt, monthly LIBOR data was 
collected from the Macrotrends database. Furthermore, exchange rates were 
collected from a database of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
1.3.3 Scope and limitations 
The focus of this thesis will be in buyout (BO) investments and especially leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs). We will focus on GPs and funds acquiring majority ownerships 
from target companies, but we will not exclude the exceptional minority 
investments of these funds. We will focus the discussion of this thesis to buyout 
investments whenever the results of previous studies can be separated into buyout 
and venture capital (CV) investments.  
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Due to the transaction data used in this thesis, and the focus of the fund-of-fund 
offering the data, this thesis will focus on mid-and large-cap buyout investments in 
the European region. Thus, we will be one of the first authors to introduce detailed 
value creation of private equity investments in Europe, while many previous studies 
have focused either to US or UK.  
1.4 Structure 
This thesis consists of five chapters. After the introduction of this chapter, a 
theoretical part will follow introducing the most relevant research around private 
equity value creation. First, literature review will introduce the concept of private 
equity asset class to offer a general idea of the operating model including the phases 
of a buyout fund lifecycle. After understanding the basics, the focus will be on the 
performance and value creation in buyout funds. First, we introduce the results of 
fund-level performance studies, and the drivers affecting the performance of a fund. 
Second, we will shift the focus to value creation at deal-level to understand how 
value is created according to the previous research. We will introduce the general 
methods to divide value creation into various levers as well as the sources and 
causes of value creation. Third, we will introduce the results of previous 
performance persistence research, which mostly consists of fund-level studies. 
 
Chapter 3 will introduce the data and methods used in this thesis. First, we will 
introduce the sources of data as well as descriptive statistics for the transaction 
samples, followed by a discussion of the variables and main assumptions associated 
with them. We will then introduce the methodology of the IVC 2.0 framework with 
a comprehensive example calculation. Lastly, we will introduce the methodology 
for studying the persistence of various value creation levers of the IVC 2.0 
framework. 
 
In chapter 4, the results of the analysis are presented. After revealing the average 
value creation attribution of the samples, the focus will shift towards the variation 
 6 
and persistence of various value creation drivers, both in general and at the level of 
individual GPs. In the fifth chapter, the practical and theoretical implications of the 
results are discussed, followed by limitations and suggestions for future research on 
the topic.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Private equity 
Private equity (PE) is an asset class investing long term capital into private 
companies in exchange for an equity stake in the company. Capital is typically 
raised from institutional investors and invested in several portfolio companies to 
create value during holding periods. Since the portfolio companies are private and 
thus their shares can not be publicly traded, PE funds aim to liquidate their 
investment through various exit routes during the divestment period to realize 
returns to the investors (Zeisberger et al. 2017). 
 
Institutionally managed private equity can be divided into three main strategies: 
venture capital (VC), growth equity (GE) and buyouts (BO). Venture capital funds 
make minority investments in early-stage companies and start-ups, which are often 
characterized by high risk and high return potential. While most of the target 
companies are still unprofitable, many also lack revenue or even the first product 
or service. Growth equity funds invest in more mature businesses that have passed 
the start-up phase and are typically growing fast. Buyout funds acquire controlling 
equity stakes in mature companies which are often generating steady cashflows. 
Majority investments enable restructuring of target companies in the investor’s 
preferred manner to create value in the company. Furthermore, buyouts are often 
characterized by high leverage and aligned economic interest between a company’s 
management and investing fund (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Ljungqvist et al. 2008, 
Zeisberger et al. 2017). In terms of committed capital, buyout strategy is by far the 
largest sector, accounting for over 70% of total PE fundraising in Europe in 2017 
(Invest Europe 2019). 
 
In addition to the three strategies, private capital – such as investments made by 
business angels and families – can be seen as an informal part of the private equity 
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field. Furthermore, real assets, such as infrastructure, natural resources and real 
estate, are traditionally categorized as a subset of PE asset class. (Zeisberger et al. 
2017) However, the focus of this thesis will be in buyout funds managed by 
institutional PE firms, which are further discussed in chapter 2.2.  
 
PE firms are companies specialized in executing one of the previously mentioned 
strategies. PE firms raise and manage funds through two separate affiliates: general 
partners (GPs) and investment managers. Most PE funds are closed-end limited 
partnerships with predetermined lifespan – typically 10 years. Limited partners 
(LPs) or investors commit their investments for this time period knowing only the 
mandate of the fund but having no rights towards individual investment decisions. 
Typical LPs are institutional investors such as insurance companies, banks, pension 
funds, corporations, family offices and fund of funds (FOFs). (Ljungqvist et al. 
2008, Zeisberger et al. 2017) The relationships between a fund’s GP, LPs and other 
stakeholders are shown in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 Limited Partnership PE Fund Structure based on Zeisberger et al. (2017)   
Capital 
GP Interest 
GP 
General Partner 
LPs 
Investors 
Sponsor 
Private Equity Firm 
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FUND 
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Manager 
Advisory 
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Portfolio companies 
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Management 
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Partnership 
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Figure 2 illustrates the contribution and reward of each stakeholder throughout the 
lifespan of the fund. GPs are responsible for managing the fund according to 
investors’ interests and they make all investment and divestment decisions to 
execute the mandate agreed upon with LPs in Limited Partnership Agreement 
(LPA). While LPs offer the majority of the fund’s committed capital, GPs and 
employees usually also contribute minority shares to align their interests with LPs. 
(Zeisberger et al. 2017) GPs’ contribution is usually at least 1%, while the mean 
ranges from 5% to 8% and can be as high as 10% of the fund’s committed capital 
(Jacobius 2017, Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Zeisberger et al. 2017). To foster the 
alignment of interests between GP and LPs, GPs typically earn 20% of the net 
profits of the fund, called as the “carried interest” (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, 
Zeisberger et al. 2017).  
 
Investment managers are responsible for day-to-day activities of the fund, which 
include deal sourcing, reporting and advisory services to existing portfolio 
companies. To cover the expenses of these services and other costs of fund 
management, investment manager charges an annual management fee of 1 to 2% 
of committed capital from investors (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Zeisberger et al. 
2017).  
2.2 Buyout funds 
PE funds aim to return capital to investors within 10 to 13 years (Harris et al. 2014b, 
Kaplan & Strömberg 2009), and funds are often raised for “10 + 2” years. Usually, 
GP has the option for two additional years in cases where more time is needed to 
exit all investments successfully (Zeisberger et al. 2017). Throughout the lifecycle 
of a buyout fund, the committed capital is invested in 10-15 portfolio companies on 
average (Zeisberger et al. 2017). The average lifespans of buyout funds have been 
increasing from 11.5 years in 2008 to 13.2 in 2014, which might be explained by 
below expected annual returns and challenging liquidation environment (Bollen 
2015).  
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The lifespan of a PE fund can be divided into four phases: fundraising, investment, 
holding and divestment period (Zeisberger et al. 2017). Figure 3 illustrates the 
typical length and timing of each phase in a 10 + 2 year fund. The fundraising period 
often starts before the first closing and continues for around a year, followed by an 
investment period of around 5 years. Divestments start around 3 years after the first 
closing and last until the end of the fund’s lifespan. Thus, the holding period lasts 
from the first closing to the last exit. We will take a closer look at each period in 
chapters 2.2.1 to 2.2.4. 
 
Figure 3 Lifecycle of a buyout fund Based on Zeisberger et al. (2017)  
 
Since the investments are made within several years and parallel to exits from other 
portfolio companies, the cash flows of a fund formulate a “J-curve” (Aigner et al. 
2008). During the first few years, cumulative cash flows are negative due to the 
acquisitions of portfolio companies. At some point, cash flow from divestments 
starts to outstrip investments, forming the bottom point for J-curve, which typically 
equals less than 80% of total committed capital (Zeisberger et al. 2017). When all 
investments are executed, the remaining cashflows are typically positive, and at 
some point, cumulative cash flows reach a break-even point, and eventually define 
the total return of the fund.   
 
Successful PE firms typically raise a fund between every 3 to 5 years (Braun & 
Schmidt 2014, Chung 2012). In addition to mitigating the risk of poor timing within 
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a fund, raising several funds enables PE firms to invest in necessary resources and 
use them efficiently in the long term (Zeisberger et al. 2017). Furthermore, as J-
curved cash flows of a fund generate most returns and compensation during the 
latter half of a fund’s lifespan, GPs are motivated to raise several funds to generate 
more stable returns (Braun & Schmidt 2014). 
2.2.1 Fundraising period 
The establishment of a PE fund begins with an important period of fundraising. For 
established PE firms, raising a follow-on fund often begins with connecting 
investors of previous funds (Zeisberger et al. 2017). To convince LPs of the GP’s 
ability to create high returns on investment, the interim performance of previous 
funds is critical, especially for low reputation GPs (Barber & Yasuda 2017). This 
motivates GPs to show great performance results early in funds lifespan to get 
follow-on funding, which can often be seen as successful early exits before follow-
on fundraising (Barber & Yasuda 2017). Braun & Schmidt (2014) have shown that 
deals exited before the final closing of follow-on fund significantly outperform 
returns of deals exited afterward, indicating the GPs challenge to balance between 
short and long term motives – getting follow-on funding and generating great 
returns with the current fund.  
 
For first-time funds, fundraising is often much more difficult due to a lack of GP’s 
comprehensive track record. To earn investors’ interest, first-time funds need to 
create a differentiated investment strategy and an gather experienced team with an 
adequate implementation plan already before approaching investors (Zeisberger et 
al. 2017). Specialization to certain geographical area, stage or industry as well as 
experience may facilitate and speed up fundraising process (Gejadze et al. 2017). 
 
The volume of buyout fundraising has been growing during recent years. Funding 
raised by direct PE funds focusing on European buyout investments grew from 
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EUR 34.0 billion in 2015 to EUR 66.5 billion in 2018, after a small decline from 
the peak of EUR 72.6 billion in 2017. In 2018, buyout fundraising represented 
68.3% of total PE fundraising. The relative contribution of investor groups has not 
changed significantly during previous years, except for pension funds, which have 
been driving the growth of fundraising as the biggest investor group (37% in 2018). 
Other large investor groups in 2018 were fund of funds (12%), insurance companies 
(11%) and sovereign wealth funds (11%). 64.0% of the funding came from 
European investors, 28.5% from North America and the remaining 7.5% from the 
rest of the world. In Europe, France was the largest contributor with a share of 
10.7% of total fundraising. (Invest Europe 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4 New funds raised (excluding capital gains) by PE focusing on European buyouts 
(Invest Europe 2019)  
2.2.2 Investment period 
Once a fund has raised the intended amount of capital, investment period is initiated 
with the closing of a first deal. During investment period, the raised capital is 
invested into 10 to 15 portfolio companies on average (Zeisberger et al. 2017). 
Investment period usually lasts 4 to 6 years (Harris et al. 2014b), while GPs often 
have an option for 1 to 2-year extension (Zeisberger et al. 2017).  
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GPs utilize several deal sources to find potential target companies. According to the 
survey of Teten and Farmer (2010), GPs’ professional relationships are primary 
sources of deal origination in buyout funds and only 44% of deals are sourced 
through in-house sourcing processes. Word of mouth, cold calls and public 
statements are also important sources as well as sell-side intermediaries, which 
represent the source of around a third of deals (Teten & Farmer 2010). These 
findings are in line with the results of Gompers et al. (2016), who find that around 
two-thirds of deals are proactively self-generated or generated by an investment 
bank.  
 
After the identification of a potential target, the sourcing process continues with 
deep due diligence of the target’s business and negotiations with the management 
of the target company (Zeisberger et al. 2017). According to Teten and Farmer 
(2010), only one out of 80 reviewed investment opportunities end up to deal closing, 
while Gompers et al. (2016) conclude that on average, 3.6% of all considered 
opportunities make it through the entire process.  
 
Buyout targets can also be sourced from different owners and thus be divided based 
on the type of buyout. Target companies can be publicly listed (public to private), 
private (independent private), divisions of a larger entity (divisional), owned by 
another PE firm (secondary), or in a distressed financial situation (distressed) 
(Zeisberger et al. 2017). Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) collected an extensive 
sample from Capital IQ consisting of over 17,000 deals between 1970 and 2007 and 
showed that public to private and divisional buyouts have both accounted for 
around 30% of deals while independent private and secondary buyouts have both 
accounted for around 20% during the sample period. Around 1% of buyouts have 
been distressed buyouts (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). The share of public to private 
deals as well as secondary buyouts was, however, growing before the financial 
crisis in 2008 (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009).  
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2.2.3 Holding period 
Holding period has a central role in the value creation of buyout investments. 
Buyout investors are typically known as active investors who actively participate 
with the management teams of target companies. Therefore, alignment of 
management’s and GP’s interests is vital and is secured through shared equity 
ownership. Furthermore, the majority ownership gives GP the right to control the 
company’s decision making through the board of the portfolio company. Majority 
ownership thus gives GPs of buyout investments an additional opportunity to create 
value by implementing strategies that best fits their interests (Zeisberger et al. 
2017). 
 
From a value creation perspective, holding period represent an increasingly 
important role (Puche et al. 2015). During holding period, GPs aim to create value 
through operational improvements in the target company, which are captured 
through revenue growth, margin improvement and generation of free cash flow 
(FCF) (Achleitner et al. 2010, Kaserer 2011). Furthermore, especially in buy-and-
build strategies, buyout investors often execute add-on acquisitions and aim to 
create value through the integration of small companies to the platform of the 
portfolio company (Achleitner et al. 2011).  
2.2.4 Divestment period 
After holding a portfolio company for around 3–5 years on average, GPs aim to 
realize the created value by selling the company. The first exit initiates divestment 
period during which a fund divests all portfolio companies and returns committed 
capital and profits for LPs. Exits can be done through various routes, and potential 
exit route is often considered already during due diligence process to evaluate the 
attractiveness of the target. In general, GPs aim to maximize the exit valuation of 
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the firm and thus choose the exit route that maximizes the returns for funds 
investors. (Zeisberger et al. 2017) 
 
Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) show that from over 17,000 investments entered 
between 1970 and 2007, the most common exit route has been a sale to a strategic 
buyer. Strategic sale is indeed an attractive exit route since industrial buyers often 
look for synergies, which increase the value of the target, thus increasing the 
possible sale price and returns for GP (Achleitner et al. 2011). Sale to a financial 
buyer, such as another PE firm, represents the second most common exit route with 
a share of 24%. The third most common exit route has been initial public offerings 
(IPOs), which have accounted for 14% of exits on average but decreased to only 
1% of all exits in 2007 (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). The pricing of IPO exit is 
highly dependent on public market valuations, and therefore attractiveness of IPO 
exit – as well as other exit routes – changes significantly over time.   
 
Gompers et al. (2016) studied the intended exit routes of GPs, and the results are 
quite similar to the results of Kaplan and Strömberg (2009). Sales to a strategic 
buyer represented the most attractive exit route in their survey, with a share of 51% 
of responses. Financial sales and IPO represented shares of 30% and 19%, 
respectively. According to the survey, sales to a strategic buyer have been by far 
the most profitable exit route, representing an IRR of around 50% on average 
compared to IRR’s of above 30% of other exits (Gompers et al. 2016). 
2.3 Buyout fund performance 
2.3.1 Performance measurement 
GPs and LPs use various performance measures to evaluate the performance of past, 
ongoing and forthcoming investments. Despite the generally prominent role of 
discounted cash flow (DCF) and net present value (NPV), only a few investors use 
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those techniques to evaluate investments. Instead, internal rate of return (IRR) and 
times money (TM) are used almost invariably in PE sector (Gompers et al. 2016).  
 
Perhaps the most widely used measure is IRR, which can be used to measure 
annualized returns for LPs. In practice, IRR is the rate of return resulting in net 
present value of zero and can be expressed with the following formula (Kaserer & 
Diller 2004):  
 
∑ 𝐶𝐹𝑡(1 + 𝐼𝑅𝑅)
−𝑡 = 0
𝑇
𝑡=0
, where 
 
T = lifetime of the fund 
𝐶𝐹𝑡 = cashflow accrued over period t.  
 
For LPs, IRR indicates annualized returns based on fund contributions and 
distribution, net of fees and carried interest paid for GP (Harris et al. 2014b). 
However, before all distributions of a fund are paid to investors, estimations of net 
asset values (NAVs) of unrealized investments have to be included in IRR 
calculations (Harris et al. 2014b). Brown et al. (2019) found that unexperienced and 
underperforming funds tend to manipulate NAVs to overstate past performance and 
thus to facilitate follow-on funding, while top-performing funds tend to understate 
valuations of unrealized investments.   
 
Unlike IRR, TM does not take time period into account and thus it measures the 
absolute returns rather than performance in time. TM – also referred as multiple of 
invested capital (MOIC) (Gompers et al. 2016) – is usually used as a performance 
measure of an individual transaction within a fund. Puche et al. (2015) defines TM 
as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑀 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
=
∆ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
. 
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Money multiple (MM) is another widely used measure which is simply calculated 
as TM + 1 (Achleitner et al. 2010). However, scholars are not unanimous about the 
definition of these measures, since some measure returns to 100% equity owners 
and others only for a GP. According to Puche et al. (2015), TM usually reflects 
returns to 100% equity owners but for example Achleitner et al. (2010) use both 
TM and MM as a measure of returns to the invested capital of GP. In this thesis, we 
will follow the definition of Puche et al. (2015) and use TM as the measure of 
returns to 100% equity owners.  
 
As absolute performance measures, IRR and TM do not take into account the 
development of public market during the fund’s lifetime. To evaluate fund 
performance in relation to the public market, Kaplan & Scholar (2005) introduced 
public market equivalent (PME) method, which compares the performance of a 
fund to a public benchmark, usually S&P 500 Index. Mathematically, PME is 
defined as follows (Kaserer & Diller 2004): 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐸 =  
∑ 𝑐𝑓𝑡 ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝐼𝑖)
𝑇
𝑖=𝑡+1
𝑇
𝑡=1
∏ (1 + 𝑅𝐼𝑖)
𝑇
𝑡=1
, where 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑖 = return of public market index in period t 
𝑐𝑓𝑡 = normalized positive cash flow (distribution) of the private equity fund in 
period t. 
 
In practice, a PME greater than 1 indicates fund’s outperformance over the 
benchmark index, while PME’s smaller than 1 means that the benchmark index has 
generated higher returns over fund lifetime net-of-fees. Thus, PME expresses how 
an equally sized investment in the public market index would have performed 
compared to investment in the underlying PE fund (Kaserer & Diller 2004). 
 18 
2.3.2 Fund returns 
Several researchers have studied the performance of private equity funds to evaluate 
the profitability of the asset class to its investors. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) used 
Venture Economics dataset containing 169 buyout funds and found average 
(median) IRR of 18% (13%) net-of-fees. More recently, Harris et al. (2014b) 
collected an exhaustive dataset of almost 600 buyout funds from Burgiss database 
and found median IRR of 14.2%, and median investment multiple of 1.97 net-of-
fees.  
 
When compared to the public market, most studies have found buyout funds 
outperforming benchmark indices. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) conclude that on 
average, buyout funds’ returns roughly equal to S&P 500 returns with PME of 0.97 
net-of-fees, while they outperform S&P 500 gross-of-fees. Stucke (2011), however, 
provided evidence of a lack of updates in Venture Economics cash flow data, which 
decreased the returns of many funds after the year 2001 in the dataset. Thus, the 
results of Kaplan and Schoar (2005) have later been questioned, and it is argued 
that the biased dataset understates the performance of buyout funds (Harris et al. 
2014b). 
 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) also used S&P 500 Index as the PME benchmark 
and found annual excess returns of 6% for PE funds, which they further attributed 
to illiquidity premium and managers’ value creation skills. To control for the 
conceivable excess risk of PE funds’, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) calculated 
betas and risk-adjusted returns and demonstrated that risk-adjusted returns of PE 
funds still beat public market. More recently, the research of Harris et al. (2014b) 
suggested annual outperformance of over 3%, and 20% to 27% outperformance 
over the fund’s lifecycle net-of-fees. For buyout funds, they found a PME of 1.16. 
Consistent with this net-of-fee outperformance, Axelson et al. (2013b) found 
outperformance of 8%, and Lopez de Silanes et al. (2011) a PME of 1.3 gross-of-
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fees. The results of these studies thus provide strong evidence of GPs’ ability to 
generate higher returns on average than public markets.  
 
While the outperformance of PE funds over S&P 500 Index returns has been 
demonstrated repeatedly, some studies have criticized previous research about 
biased datasets and found PE funds to underperform other benchmarks when taking 
higher betas into account. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008) criticize earlier studies 
about inflated NAVs and biased fund samples. They found that S&P 500 Index 
outperformed PE funds 3% p.a. net-of-fees and 6% when adjusted for risk. A few 
years later, Phalippou (2013) argued that PE funds invest in small-cap companies, 
and thus small-cap index should be used as a benchmark instead of S&P 500 Index. 
Using French small-value index and DFA’s value mutual fund as benchmarks, 
Phalippou (2013) found average PME’s of 0.96 and 1.00 respectively, and PE 
funds’ underperformance of 3.1% p.a. and PME of 0.9 when adjusted for a higher 
beta. These results indicate how sensitive PME results are to benchmark selection 
and thus highlight the problems related to PME method when used as an indicator 
of GPs’ ability to create abnormal performance. 
2.3.3 Performance drivers 
Since the outperformance of private equity funds over public markets seem to be 
proven – at least gross-of-fees – researchers have shifted the focus towards 
explaining the abnormal returns of the asset class. Several studies have investigated 
the drivers of PE fund returns to better understand the sources of the relatively high 
performance. Based on previous literature, drivers can be broadly divided into two 
categories: exogenous factors and endogenous factors (Aigner et al. 2008). 
 
Exogenous drivers refer to external factors, such as public market development, 
interest rate and GDP growth. Researchers have identified several exogenous 
factors that have been driving the returns of PE funds. Phalippou and Zollo (2005), 
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and Jegadeesh et al. (2009) found a positive correlation between fund performance 
and gross domestic product (GDP). Also, Aigner et al. (2008) identified positive 
correlation between GDP with both IRR and PME, and negative correlation 
between performance and vintage year GDP. Similarly, Phalippou and Zollo 
(2005), and Aigner et al. (2008) identified stock market returns to be positively 
correlated with fund performance, and negative correlation between performance 
and vintage year stock market, using MSCI World Index as the benchmark. 
Contrary to these findings, Diller and Kaserer (2009) found no correlation between 
performance and stock market returns and negative correlation between 
performance and GDP. 
 
Since high leverage is peculiar to buyout transactions, the returns of PE funds are 
subject to capital and credit market conditions. Phalippou and Zollo (2005), and 
Aigner et al. (2008) found negative association between fund returns and interest 
rates, and Robinson and Sensoy (2013) concluded debt market conditions to have a 
significant impact on PE cash flows. Ljungqvist et al. (2008) also found that lower 
debt yields were associated with higher returns. Phalippou and Zollo (2005) found 
positive association between corporate bond yields and fund performance. Aligned 
with their findings, Jegadeesh et al. (2009) found negative association between 
credit spread and performance, using the difference between the yields of BAA and 
AAA-rated corporate bonds. However, Axelson (2013a) found that higher leverage 
leads to lower returns and justified the claim with the acquirers’ tendency to 
overpay in favourable credit conditions.  
 
Another significant market-related factor driving the performance of PE funds is 
the increasing competition of target companies, which has led to an increased 
amount of uninvested committed capital – called the “dry powder” – in the industry 
(Zeisberger et al. 2017). Gompers and Lerner (2000)  introduced this driver as the 
“money chasing deals” phenomenon and found evidence of industry’s total fund 
inflows driving the valuations of funds’ investments, thus affecting the returns of 
PE funds. While this phenomenon is especially strong in more illiquid and 
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segmented VC funds (Diller & Kaserer 2009), it is also present in buyout funds, of 
which Ljungqvist et al. (2008) and Harris et al. (2014b) provided evidence. Using 
a sample of 207 buyout funds, Ljungqvist et al. (2008) found that the greater the 
inflow of money into private equity funds, the longer it takes for GP to meet LPs’ 
target returns. Furthermore, they concluded that the decreasing number of 
favourable investment targets leads to lower returns of PE funds, fostering the effect 
of the phenomenon. Table 1 summarizes the associations between exogenous 
drivers and fund performance.  
 
Table 1 Findings of exogenous fund performance drivers in previous literature 
Driver Findings Research 
Stock market 
return 
Association (+) (Aigner et al. 2008, Phalippou & 
Zollo 2005) 
 Vintage year MSCI 
return (–) 
(Aigner et al. 2008) 
GDP Association (+) (Aigner et al. 2008, Jegadeesh et al. 
2009, Phalippou & Zollo 2005) 
 Vintage year GDP (–) (Aigner et al. 2008) 
 Economic 
development (–) 
(Diller & Keserer 2009) 
Credit market 
conditions 
Credit spread (–) (Jegadeesh et al. 2009) 
Corporate bond yields 
(+) 
(Phalippou & Zollo 2005) 
Debt yields (–) (Ljungqvist et al. 2008) 
 Interest rate (–) (Aigner et al. 2008, Phalippou & 
Zollo 2005) 
Competition Association (–) (Diller & Kaserer 2009, Gompers & 
Lerner 2000, Harris et al. 2014b, 
Ljungqvist et al. 2008) 
Signs in parentheses illustrate positive (+), negative (–) or lack of association (?) between the 
underlying factor and fund performance. 
 
In addition to exogenous drivers, several endogenous factors have been found to 
explain PE funds’ performance. Endogenous drivers refer to fund characteristics 
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such as size, region and industry. One of the most studied driver is fund size, of 
which literature provides somewhat contradicting results. Phalippou and Zollo 
(2005) found positive association between fund size and performance with a dataset 
containing 539 VC and 166 buyout funds. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) found 
concave, albeit not significant association between buyout funds size and 
performance, and positive association for all funds in cross-section. Similarly, 
Harris et al. (2014b), Kaserer and Diller (2004), and Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (2011) 
find no relationship between buyout fund size and performance, while a strong 
positive relationship is present for VC funds (Harris et al. 2014b).  
 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (2011) find that the number of simultaneous investments 
has negative relation to fund performance, which in turn is conflicting with the 
results of Aigner et al. (2008), which suggest a positive association. Aigner et al. 
(2008) and Humphery-Jenner (2011) found negative association between fund size 
and performance, which further illustrates the inconsistent results of the studies. For 
buyout funds, however, the relation between fund size and performance seems to 
be rather negative than positive, indicating diseconomies of scale. Marquez et al. 
(2014) justify the phenomenon as fund managers attempt to keep fund size small to 
demonstrate value adding abilities for prospective firms and keep the costs of firm 
development low. 
 
To evaluate GPs’ ability to create value, researchers have studied the effect of GP 
experience to fund performance. Aigner et al. (2008), Diller and Kaserer (2009), 
and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008) have shown that the increasing experience of 
GP results in higher fund performance on average. Similarly, Phalippou and Zollo 
(2005) found that inexperienced funds perform worse than PE funds on average. 
While higher experience might be associated with higher management fees, 
Robinson & Sensoy (2013) show positive association between fees and 
performance, indicating that experienced managers can justify higher fees. Despite 
the higher performance of experienced GPs, Aigner et al. (2008) found experienced 
GPs to make more unprofitable investments, which indicates their higher appetite 
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for risk. Idiosyncratic risk is another driver that has been found to be positively 
associated with fund returns (Diller & Kaserer 2009, Ljungqvist & Richardson 
2003, Phalippou & Zollo 2005). Table 1 summarizes the associations between 
endogenous drivers and fund performance. 
 
Table 2 Findings of endogenous fund performance drivers in previous literature 
Driver Findings Research 
Fund size Association (+) (Higson & Stucke 2012, Kaplan & 
Schoar 2005, Phalippou & Zollo 
2005) 
 Association (–) (Aigner et al. 2008, Humphery-
Jenner 2011) 
 Association, buyout 
funds only (?) 
(Harris et al. 2014b, Kaplan & 
Schoar, 2005, Kaserer & Diller 
2004, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 2011)  
Number of 
simultaneous 
investments 
Association (+) (Aigner et al. 2008) 
Association (–) (Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 2011) 
GP GP experience (+) (Aigner et al. 2008, Diller & 
Kaserer 2009, Korteweg & 
Sorensen 2017, Phalippou & 
Gottschalg 2008) 
 Management fees (+) (Robinson & Sensoy 2013) 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Association (+) (Diller & Kaserer 2009, Ljungqvist 
& Richardson 2003, Phalippou & 
Zollo 2005) 
 Beta (?) (Phalippou & Zollo 2005) 
Signs in parentheses illustrate positive (+), negative (–) or lack of association (?) between the 
underlying factor and fund performance. 
 
Several researchers have aimed to explain the performance of PE funds with 
different exogenous and endogenous drivers. Despite the large number of studies, 
strong evidence remains to be provided to explain whether the superior performance 
is due to the experience of GP or pure luck (Gohil & Vyas 2016). To better 
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understand the sources of abnormal returns, researchers have shifted their focus 
towards value creation at deal-level.  
2.4 Deal-level value creation 
2.4.1 Value creation decomposition 
To understand the performance of PE funds and how they perform compared public 
markets, one must understand how value is being created at deal-level (Harris et al. 
2014b, Puche et al. 2015). Berg and Gottschalg (2005) introduce three alternative 
approaches to deal value creation. First, created value can be divided based on the 
phases it is being created. These phases refer to the four periods of fund lifecycle 
introduced in chapter 2.2. Second, value creation can be divided based on the source 
of value creation – intrinsic or extrinsic – depending on the degree to which it 
depends on equity investor’s activity. Intrinsic value creation refers to value 
creation that would have emerged without the contribution of equity investor, 
whereas extrinsic value creation is inherently linked to equity investor’s 
characteristics, such as network, experience, expertise or other capabilities. Third, 
perhaps most commonly, value is divided based on its causes. Following simple 
accounting math, equity value can be decomposed into four components, leading to 
the following formula (Berg & Gottschalg 2005):  
 
 Equity value = Valuation multiple ∗ Revenue ∗ Margin – Net debt.  
 
Changes in equity value can thus be linked to one of the four components. The 
change in equity value is commonly captured with a methodology called value 
bridge, which resembles the previously presented formula. Conventional value 
bridge captures the contribution of changes in valuation multiple, EBITDA and net 
debt to change in equity value of a company, using TM as the unit of value creation  
(Zeisberger et al. 2016). While the method is highly simplified, it is easy to apply 
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and thus widely used among industry practitioners (Achleitner et al. 2010, Porter & 
Porter 2018).  
 
On the other hand, the conventional value bridge has several severe limitations. For 
example, it does not take into account the capital structure of a company, which 
precludes the comparison of investments with unequal financial risks (Achleitner 
et al. 2010, Porter & Porter 2018). Furthermore, multiplication of simultaneous 
changes in EBITDA and valuation multiple causes a combination effect that is 
commonly allocated to multiple driver, overstating its contribution to total value 
creation (Achleitner et al. 2010, Puche et al. 2015, Zeisberger et al. 2016). These 
limitations have motivated scholars to develop advanced frameworks. 
 
The risk of a leveraged company consists of operational and financial risk and is 
thus subject to debt-to-equity ratio. Achleitner et al. (2010) took this fact into 
account and divided changes in equity to return generated by 100% equity financed 
company and leverage effect using the following unlevering formula: 
 
𝑟𝑢,𝑖 =  
𝑟𝑙,𝑖 + 𝑟𝐷,𝑖 (
𝐷
𝐸𝑖
)
1 + (
𝐷
𝐸𝑖
)
, where 
 
𝑟𝑢,𝑖 =  unlevered return 
𝑟𝑙,𝑖 = levered return 
𝐷
𝐸𝑖
 = average debt-to-equity ratio 
𝑟𝐷,𝑖 = average cost of debt. 
 
Achleitner et al. (2010) added another component to unlevered value creation by 
including combination effect resulting from the multiplication of simultaneous 
changes in EBITDA and multiple. Furthermore, they replaced net debt component 
with FCF effect, which represents the free cash flow generated to pay off debt and 
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finance dividends, thus eliminating some limitations of the conventional value 
bridge. Kaserer (2011) and Puche et al. (2015) further developed the value bridge 
of Achleitner et al. (2010) by dividing EBITDA effect into margin and revenue 
components. As in the case of multiplication of changes in valuation multiple and 
EBITDA, they added a combination effect component resulting from the 
multiplication of simultaneous changes in margin and revenue. The resulting 
framework is illustrated below with a fictional transaction.  
 
 
Figure 5 Advanced value bridge introduced by Puche et al. (2015)    
 
Although the advanced value bridge offers significantly more transparent picture of 
transaction value creation across different levers, it still has significant 
shortcomings. The framework does not separate intrinsic and extrinsic value 
creation and thus fails to indicate whether the value creation was achieved by 
favourable market conditions or GP’s actions and skills (Porter & Porter 2018). 
Furthermore, especially in buy-and-build strategies, add-on acquisitions represent 
a significant part in value creation, but the methodology fails to distinguish whether 
the value creation was achieved through organic or inorganic activities. Thus, the 
framework does not elicit abnormal performance of GP, and can not be used to 
evaluate and understand GPs ability to create value (Zeisberger et al. 2016) 
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To overcome these limitations, Zeisberger et al. (2016) introduced IVC 2.0 
framework. In addition to the value creation levers introduced by Puche et al. 
(2015), IVC 2.0 framework divides value creation components into sub-
components representing value creation through acquisitions and public market 
development, revealing the components of GPs abnormal performance. To the best 
of our knowledge, no studies have so far applied this framework with large deal-
level dataset. In this thesis, we will apply this methodology, and introduce it in 
detail in chapter 3.3.2. 
2.4.2 Deal characteristics and returns 
The most extensive studies have shown buyout deals median IRRs to range from 
20 to 21%, and PMEs to range from 1.29 to 1.3 (Braun & Schmidt 2014, Lopez-de-
Silanes et al. 2011, Puche et al. 2015), while TMs have been around 2.4 (Kaserer 
2011, Puche et al. 2015). These findings are in line with GPs’ target IRR of 20 to 
25% introduced by Gompers et al. (2016). Studies with smaller and more niche 
samples, however, have reported median IRRs over 40% (Acharya et al. 2012, 
Kaserer 2011). To better understand the variation in deal-level returns, scholars 
have divided samples based on their characteristics and have found interesting 
results.  
 
Table 3 Most extensive performance studies conducted with deal-level data 
Research Sample size Regions Period 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 2011 7,453 Worldwide 1973–2005 
Graf et al. 2012 12,096 Worldwide 1973–2008 
Braun & Schmidt 2014 10,566 Worldwide 1976–2007 
Puche et al. 2015 2,029 Worldwide 1984–2013 
 
As a consequence of the maturing industry, the returns of investments have been 
declining significantly. Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (2011) found median IRRs declining 
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from 26% between years 1973 and 1995 to 18% between 1996 and 2005. The 
relatively high-performing final sample of Puche et al. (2015) indicated 51% IRR 
for investments exited before 2000 compared to the IRR of 25% of investments 
exited between 2009 and 2013, thus providing rare evidence of post-financial crisis 
returns. In addition to declining trend, Graf et al. (2012) provided evidence of 
cyclicality of the returns. Deals exited during the dot-com bubble (1998-2001) and 
buyout bubble (2005-2007) yielded significantly lower returns compared to others 
due to challenging exit environments.  
 
Size of a transaction – usually measured as the equity investment size – has been 
found to be positively associated with deal returns (Nikoskelainen & Wright 2007, 
Söffge & Braun 2018, Valkama et al. 2013). Assuming that investment size is 
associated with fund size, the result indicates a conflict with the fund-level literature 
indicating rather diseconomies of scale (Aigner et al. 2008, Humphery-Jenner 
2011). Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) justify the outperformance of large 
investment with lower bankruptcy risk, diversified business portfolios and PE 
sponsors increased motive to support large equity investments. The scholars, 
however, are not unanimous about the outperformance of large investments. Lopez-
de-Silanes et al. (2011) found large investments outperforming small when 
compared to industry benchmark, but similar returns for all investment sizes using 
absolute performance measures. These findings, in turn, are conflicting with the 
sample of Puche et al. (2015), who find negative correlation with absolute 
performance measures. Related to equity investment size, Aigner et al. (2008) and 
Kaserer (2011) found positive association between buyout ratio and deal returns. 
 
Regardless of the performance measure, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (2011) found 
significant negative relationship between the length of holding period and returns 
of the investments. The median TM multiples ranged from 2.4 of under 2-year 
investments to 1.6 of over 6-year investments, and the difference was even greater 
with PME and IRR measures. Related to intra-fund timing, Braun and Schmidt 
(2014) found deals exited before the closing of follow-on fund to significantly 
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outperform deals exited afterward, which indicates GPs’ motive to prove high 
performance for LPs to facilitate follow-on fundraising. 
 
Deal returns are also dependent on exit method, which explains some of the 
variation among investments’ returns. Lopez-de-Silanes (2011), Kaserer (2011), 
and Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) found IPOs to create the highest IRR, while 
SBOs yielded the highest TM in Kaserer’s research (2011). The high performance 
of SBOs is supported by the results of Achleitner and Figge (2014) who find 
secondary buyouts to be 6 to 9% more expensive for buyers than other buyouts, 
indicating higher exit price for selling party. Furthermore, Nikoskelainen and 
Wright (2007) (2014)found management equity stake to be significant return driver 
in large and successful buyouts, and Guo et al. (2011) found those buyouts to 
perform better where CEO is replaced. These results indicate the importance of 
aligned interests and management’s capabilities. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, Puche et al. (2015) are the only ones who have 
studied and compared deal value creation attribution in different geographical areas 
with a large dataset. They found North American deals to generate higher returns 
than European and Asian deals, with TM of 3.8 compared to 3.3 in the rest of the 
world. The closer examination of return drivers revealed that higher returns were 
mostly explained by higher leverage of North American deals.  
 
The most comprehensive analysis of deal returns across different industries was 
conducted by Graf et al. (2012), who divided returns into abnormal and industry 
returns. Of 3,296 international buyout transactions, natural resources, high-tech & 
semiconductor industries yielded the highest returns with average IRRs of 70.6%, 
62.1% and 59.1%, respectively. In contrast, leisure, consumer industry and 
industrials & manufacturing industries yielded the lowest returns, with average 
IRRs of 7.8%, 29.1% and 32.8%, respectively. Puche et al. (2015) studied value 
creation across industries using conventional value bridge. By dividing transactions 
to industrials, consumer services, consumer goods and technology services 
 30 
industries, they found TMs of 3.7, 3.6, 3.3 and 2.8, respectively, with only minor 
relative differences in value creation drivers. 
2.4.3 Causes of value creation 
As shown in the previous chapter, deal returns vary depending on several factors, 
including deal size, buyout ratio, industry, geographical area and exit methods. 
Therefore, to better understand how value is created at deal-level, scholars have 
taken a closer look at the causes of value creation. As in the advanced value bridge 
of Puche et al. (2015), value creation can be split into three main categories: 
operational improvements, multiple expansion and leverage (Kaplan & Strömberg 
2009).  
 
As a consequence of increasing competition and tightened credit conditions, the 
role of operational improvements in value creation has been growing. Puche et al. 
(2015) find that operational improvements account for around 50% of value 
creation since GPs have been forced to go deeper into portfolio companies to find 
value creation opportunities. In the sample of Kaserer (2011), operational 
improvements played an even greater role accounting for around 75% of value 
creation. These findings are in line with the results of Graf et al. (2012) and 
Gompers et al. (2016) who conclude operational improvements to be the main 
driver of value creation.  
 
Despite the small number of studies examining the value creation among 
operational improvement drivers, revenue growth seems to be the main driver over 
margin growth and FCF effect. Kaserer (2011) found revenue growth to account for 
around half of the value created through operational improvements and around 40% 
of total value creation. Puche et al. (2015) found similar results concluding that 
revenue growth accounted for 60% of the value created through operational 
improvements and 30% of total value creation on average. Puche et al. (2015) also 
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found revenue growth to be a significant value driver, especially for small 
companies. Söffge and Braun (2018) differentiated organic and inorganic deals and 
found revenue growth to be a significant value driver only for organic deals, which 
illustrates the various value creation opportunities offered by different strategies.   
Margin improvement and FCF seems to be less significant causes of value creation 
in buyouts. Both Puche et al. (2015) and Kaserer (2011), however, found FCF to be 
a more significant driver than margin growth. Kaserer (2011) found FCF to account 
for 27% of value creation while the contribution in the sample of Puche et al. (2015) 
was 12%. The corresponding values for margin effect were only 17% and 7%. The 
trend in FCF contribution has, however, been declining while the margin effect has 
remained approximately the same during previous decades (Puche et al. 2015). 
 
The second category for value creation is multiple expansion, which is driven by 
two main factors: market timing skills and negotiation skills of the PE firm 
(Achleitner et al. 2011). Interestingly, previous studies have found multiple growth 
to have a rather small contribution to value creation. Puche et al. (2015) found a 
contribution of 15% while Guo et al. (2011) found multiple to account for around 
20% of returns to pre-buyout capital. Puche et al. (2015) also found that multiple 
expansion was more important driver for small companies, which might be 
explained by the lower valuation multiples of companies with higher bankruptcy 
risk. Kaserer (2011), however, found that portfolio firms were sold at lower 
multiples than acquired, resulting in a contribution of -10% to value creation. 
 
The third category of value creation is the leverage effect resulting from debt used 
in acquisition financing. Achleitner et al. (2010), Kaserer (2011) and Puche et al. 
(2015) all found leverage effect to contribute around a third of value creation. 
However, Axelson et al. (2013a) and Braun et al. (2017a) found higher leverage to 
be associated with lower returns, which is explained by acquirers' tendency to 
overpay when access to credit is easier. However, the contribution of leverage has 
been decreasing as a consequence of tightening credit market conditions. Puche et 
al. (2015) found a decline from 34% in deals exited between 1987 and 2000 to 30% 
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in deals exited between 2009 and 2013. They also illustrated significant positive 
association between relative leverage contribution and deal size. Valkama et al. 
(2013) found that leverage barely improved value creation in buyouts but did inflate 
equity returns, especially in high performing deals.  
 
Although the contribution of the three main categories can be separately observed, 
the categories are not mutually independent. Achleitner et al. (2011) found a 
positive association between sales growth and exit multiples, thus offering a third 
alternative path for multiple expansion. They justified the association by acquirers' 
willingness to pay a premium for sustainable past growth and the correlation of 
increased sales with more stable cash flows (Achleitner et al. 2011). Similar 
association was not found for margin and exit multiple (Achleitner et al. 2011) or 
EBITDA and leverage (Kaserer 2011). However, previous research shows that in 
addition to direct impact, value drivers may have indirect effects on value creation 
through the influence on other drivers.  
2.4.4 Sources of value creation 
The sources of value is the second approach to value creation introduced by Berg 
and Gottschalg (2005). The source of value creation can be either intrinsic or 
extrinsic, depending on the degree to which it depends on equity investor’s activity. 
Intrinsic value creation refers to value creation that would have emerged without 
the contribution of equity investor, whereas extrinsic value creation is inherently 
linked to equity investor’s characteristics, such as network, experience, expertise or 
other capabilities (Berg & Gottschalg 2005). Extrinsic value creation is often 
referred as abnormal performance or alpha whereas intrinsic value creation is 
captured trough market development driver using index or peer group as a 
benchmark.  
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Researchers have aimed to separate intrinsic and extrinsic value creation by 
comparing investment returns to various benchmarks. Graf et al. (2012) used an 
extensive sample of over 3,000 buyout transactions and found that alpha 
represented 76% of value creation, while public market development represented 
the remaining 24%. While most fund-level studies use S&P 500 Index as the PME 
benchmark, Graf et al. (2012) used worldwide total return indices of 12 industries 
to compare each investment to the development of the corresponding industry. 
Acharya et al. (2012) separate the effect of leverage from the returns and find 
leverage accounting for 50% of value creation while alpha and public markets 
contributed 34% and 16%, respectively. The results of the studies are summarized 
in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 Results of value creation through alpha, public market and leverage 
 
Perembetov et al. (2014) conducted another research using a sample of 241 buyouts. 
They found leverage effect to account for only 31% of created value, while public 
market development contributed 32%, leaving the remaining 38% to alpha. Ernst 
& Young (2014) found alpha to contribute 38% of value on average while public 
markets accounted for 32% of created value. The results of Perembetov et al. 2014, 
however, are not comparable with the studies of Acharya et al. 2012 and Ernst & 
Young 2014, who calculate leverage as the additional leverage compared to public 
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peer group companies. Ernst & Young (2014) find additional leverage to account 
for 31% of value creation. Although the returns have been declining during the 
period of the sample of Ernst & Young (2014), they find that the relative 
contribution of alpha has increased from 34% between 2005 and 2007 to 41% 
between 2010 and 2013. During the same time period, the contribution of leverage 
has declined from 33% to 26% while the contribution of public market has remained 
roughly the same. 
2.5 Performance persistence 
When considering investment opportunities, pension funds, funds-of-funds and 
other LPs use past investment performance to evaluate a GP’s ability to create value 
in the future. While high past performance indicates a GP’s value creation ability 
in the past, it is a good predictor of future performance only if the performance of 
the GP is persistent. To address LPs’ issue of finding top-performing PE funds, 
scholars have conducted researches to study the persistence of PE funds’ 
performance.  
 
One of the pioneering works in this field was the study of Kaplan and Scholar 
(2005), who were the first to provide evidence of performance persistence. They 
used a sample of 169 buyout funds of vintages between 1983 and 1997 and found 
strong persistence across both ends of performance distribution with both IRR and 
PME measures. They also checked that the results are not driven by differences in 
risks, industry, investment stage or sample selection bias. 
 
Several other scholars later confirmed the results of Kaplan and Scholar (2005). 
Aigner et al. (2008) studied persistence by comparing the quartiles of two 
consecutive funds of a GP, i.e. Markov transition probabilities. They used net and 
gross IRR and PME measures and demonstrated strong persistence in top-quartile 
using net IRR measure: 42% of top-quartile funds were able to achieve top-quartile 
performance in the following fund. Also, they found second quartile funds to make 
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higher-risk investments as the probability of achieving top quartile (bottom 
quartile) performance was 50% (25%). Furthermore, by using several performance 
measures, Aigner et al. (2008) note that too many funds might claim to be top 
quartile, since the decision of the used measure is left to fund manager’s choice. 
Harris et al. (2012) later provided a more profound discussion around this issue. 
 
Diller & Kaserer (2009) also found significant persistence for buyout funds: an 
increase of 1 percentage point in the IRR of the preceding fund led to an increase 
of 0.4 to 0.7 percentage point in the IRR of the following fund. Contrary to common 
belief, they conclude that persistence was not achieved through GP’s market timing 
skills. In addition to studying the correlation of two consecutive funds, Chung 
(2012) studied the persistence to second and third follow-on funds and concluded 
that performance exists only in the short-term. Furthermore, he states a theory that 
LPs are chasing top-performing funds, leading to the growth of these funds, 
incapability to maintain high performance, and eventually to decreasing 
persistence.  
 
More recent studies have evidenced performance persistence to decrease after 2000. 
Harris et al. (2014a) found strong persistence for buyout funds before 2000 but 
persistence only for the lower part of performance distribution post-2000. In other 
words, they concluded that persistence has disappeared among top-performing 
funds after 2000. Korteweg and Sorensen (2017) also conclude that performance 
persistence has decreased post-2000, but they still find substantial persistence both 
before and after 2000. Buchner et al. (2016) are one of the firsts to study persistence 
outside the US. They use an extensive deal-level sample and find persistence to 
exist, and to be weaker outside the US. However, the results are conflicting with 
the findings of Korteweg and Sorensen (2017) who find stronger persistence outside 
the US. Buchner et al. (2016) also find that risk is an important driver of 
performance persistence and is itself persistent.  
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Korteweg and Sorensen (2017) apply an analysis of variance (ANOVA) method 
instead of AR(1) models and Markov transition probabilities applied by previous 
scholars. They isolate three components of persistence: long-term, investable and 
spurious persistence. The three components illustrate PE funds’ ability to create 
consistently outperforming returns, LPs difficulty of identifying top performers 
with higher expected returns, and the persistence that arises from the partially 
overlapping consecutive funds of a PE firm, respectively. By separating the three 
components of persistence, Korteweg and Sorensen (2017) evidence strong long-
term persistence in expected net-of-fee returns and find top-quartile PE firms to 
have 7 to 8 percentage points higher expected annual return when compared to 
bottom quartile. Also, they find that more persistence and investable persistence 
exists among smaller funds. However, due to noisy persistence, they find that 
identifying future top-performing funds is difficult, leaving little investable 
persistence. The results are in line with the findings of Sensoy et al. (2014) who 
find that no particular type of LP can choose outperforming buyout funds.  
 
There are several problems related to studying persistence at fund-level, which 
might explain the scholars' incapability of finding persistence post-2000. Since 
follow-on funds are raised typically between 3 to 5 years, and funds lifespan is over 
13 years on average (Bollen 2015), consecutive funds have an overlap of around 8 
to 10 years on average. Similar economic conditions during two funds thus cause a 
significant correlation between the returns of the funds, which causes artificial 
persistence (Chung 2012, Korteweg & Sorensen 2017). Furthermore, two 
consecutive funds of GP share one investment on average, which fosters artificial 
persistence (Braun et al. 2017b). Fund-level performance data is usually available 
net-of-fees which further blurs the view of GPs’ real value creation abilities. Thus, 
fund-level studies focus on persistence between two legal entities – PE funds – 
rather than gross-of-fees performance of GPs (Braun et al. 2017b). 
 
Having fund-level data also limits significantly the number of consecutive data 
points available (Korteweg & Sorensen 2017). Most recent funds often include 
 37 
unrealized investments, which NAV’s are often biased and manipulated (Brown et 
al. 2019), making persistence results less reliable. Realized returns are known only 
several years after raising a follow-on fund, and therefore can not be used to predict 
follow-on performance in practice. If unrealized investments are excluded, sample 
size often decreases significantly, excluding the results of most recent funds.  
Some issues of fund-level persistence are caused by the idea of PME – comparing 
returns to public market index, usually S&P 500. It could be argued that the method 
is too simplified to identify persistence and GP skills across all geographical areas 
and industries. Furthermore, when calculating PME, fund-level studies rely on fund 
vintage year and lifetime and assume that investments are distributed evenly across 
funds lifecycle. This, however, is not the case in practice, and the distribution of 
investments across a fund’s lifecycle can vary significantly among funds. Thus, 
changing market conditions during funds lifecycle foster the bias of the PME 
method and fund-level persistence research (Braun et al. 2017b). 
 
To overcome some of the problems related to fund-level persistence, Braun et al. 
(2017b) used a deal-level dataset to examine the persistence between two 
consecutive transactions of a GP using PME as the measure. They find that an 
increase of 1% in the return of the previous deal is associated with an increase of 
10.2 basis points higher return. After controlling for deal and fund characteristics, 
the number decreases to 6.3 basis points but remains significant. In addition to 
studying the correlation between two consecutive transactions, they also test if GPs 
vary systematically in their average performance over all samples and find the 
identity of GP to explain the heterogeneity across deals to some extent. Consistent 
with the results at fund-level, Braun et al. (2017b) find that persistence has declined 
post-2000. The decreasing persistence is partly explained by the increasing 
competition since they find that significantly higher persistence at times of low 
competition.  
 
Similarly to fund-level studies, Braun et al. (2017b) also study the performance by 
quartile and in low and high competition states. They find that top-quartile 
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persistence is high during low competition states but decreases significantly when 
the competition is high. Furthermore, they find significant bottom-quartile 
persistence irrespective of the competitive situation. This implies that selecting GPs 
who perform top quartile deals has become difficult while bottom quartile 
performers could still be avoided to some extent. 
2.6 Synthesis of literature review 
Several scholars have studied the performance of PE funds as well as the underlying 
drivers. Exogenous drivers, such as stock market returns, GDP, credit market 
conditions, and competition, as well as endogenous drivers, including fund size, 
fund vintage, GP experience, number of portfolio companies, and idiosyncratic risk 
have been found to explain the variation in PE returns. Most studies have found PE 
funds to outperform public markets – at least gross-of-fees – indicating that PE 
firms are able to grow companies faster than public markets on average.  
 
To understand how outperformance is achieved, scholars have studied value 
creation at deal-level. In addition to fund-level drivers, transaction size, holding 
period, exit method, geographical area, and industry have been found to be 
significant performance drivers at deal-level. The scholars studying the causes of 
value creation have found operational improvements to have an increasingly 
important role in value creation while the leverage effect has decreased slightly over 
time. Operational improvements are mainly achieved through increasing sales 
which indicates GPs increasing need to dig deeper into portfolio companies' 
businesses to find value creation opportunities.  
 
Other scholars have approached value creation from the perspective of causes. 
Depending on the method applied, some scholars have found leverage, market 
returns and alpha to have a roughly equally important role in value creation while 
others have found alpha to have even greater role. Previous scholars have, however, 
used oversimplified benchmarks to extract alpha, which often does not take industry 
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or geographical area into account. Furthermore, their methodologies have not been 
able to reveal whether the value creation was achieved through organic or inorganic 
growth, which adds serious bias to the results of these studies. No studies have so 
far combined the view of value creation sources and causes, or explained how PE 
deals create the outperformance over public markets in detail. 
 
LPs are looking for high returns and thus aim to identify future top-performing 
funds. LPs utilize the information of GPs’ previous performance to evaluate 
whether they should invest in the follow-on funds. However, the process is 
reasonable only if GPs can create value persistently, meaning that previous 
performance is a good predictor of future performance. Scholars have studied 
persistence mostly at fund-level and found significant persistence pre-2000. Post-
2000, however, persistence has decreased significantly due to increasing 
competition, leaving little investable persistence.  
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3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Data collection 
The rarely accessible PE transaction data was collected from a fund of fund (FOF) 
investing in the funds of other PE firms. The focus of the FOF is in managers 
investing in small- and mid-cap companies in Europe, and thus the dataset and this 
thesis are focused on the value creation of these segments. The transaction data was 
collected from European PE managers as part of the due diligence process of the 
FOF to evaluate the past performance of PE firms. The entire dataset contained a 
total of 1,685 transactions executed between 1989 and 2018.  
 
The dataset contained information about PE firms, fund characteristics, fund cash 
flows for each investment as well as entry, exit and acquired financials for all 
transactions. Most transactions of the dataset, however, were not realized or missed 
one or more datapoint needed in the calculations, and thus could not be used in the 
analysis. Table 4 illustrates the process of formulating final samples by excluding 
insufficient transactions. 
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Table 4 Sample selection process 
Sample name Excluded transactions N IRR TM 
Entire dataset  1’685 N/A N/A 
 
Transactions with 
missing information to 
calculate IRR and TM 
   
  713 43.0% 3.2 
 Unrealized investments    
  332 52.7% 3.9 
 
Insufficient input values, 
missing industry peers 
   
Full sample  297 52.5% 3.2 
 No add-on data    
Add-on sample  75 42.3% 2.6 
 
First, transactions with missing values to calculate IRR and TM values were 
excluded, resulting in 713 transactions with an average IRR of 43.0% and average 
TM of 3.2 for 100% equity owners. Second, transactions for which realized value 
was below 75% of total estimated value were excluded to mitigate the bias caused 
by NAV’s of unrealized investments and to better capture the effect of private 
equity owner on value creation. This resulted in a sample of 332 transactions with 
an average IRR of 52.7% and an average TM of 3.9. Value creation attribution was 
calculated for this sample, but results were drawn only for 297 transactions due to 
failure to find enough comparable public companies for some transactions. 
Furthermore, insufficient input values caused calculation errors in the case of some 
transactions, and therefore those were excluded in the calculations. The average 
IRR of the resulting sample (full sample) was 52.5% while the average TM was 3.2.  
 
The data of the full sample has a shortcoming which affects the reliability of the 
value creation results. Of 297 transactions, 222 transactions lacked add-on data and 
therefore acquired value could not be separated from organic value creation in all 
transactions. Furthermore, it was not reported whether additional equity injections 
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were executed in these 222 transactions, and thus the actual return on equity might 
have been lower. For this reason, we limited the dataset to 75 transactions (add-on 
sample) which contained full add-on data or information that no add-ons were 
executed. As expected, capital injections of add-on sample lowered average IRR to 
42.3% and average TM to 2.6. In general, both samples seem to represent well the 
entire sample when it comes to the returns on equity. In further analysis, we will 
use both samples to have both a large sample size and accurate value creation data. 
Detailed descriptive statistics of both samples will be presented in the next chapter.  
 
While most previous studies use S&P 500 as the benchmark investments, we used 
a set of comparable public companies with several financial measures to extract the 
abnormal performance of GPs. The financial information of public companies was 
collected from Capital IQ database using geographical area, SIC-codes, company 
type and dates as selection criteria. The final sample contained financial 
information of 8,761 public companies between years 1990 and 2019.  
 
Interest rates were needed to quantify the total impact of incremental leverage on 
value creation. While Achleitner et al. (2010) used a fixed base rate for all 
transactions, we calculated individual interest rates for each transaction. Following 
Puche et al. (2015), we used LIBOR of entry month as the base rate for each 
transaction. Furthermore, we added 300 basis points – median spread over LIBOR 
of LBOs between 1993 and 2005 reported by Ivashina and Kovner (2011) – to get 
the total interest rate for each transaction.  
 
Since tax rates were not included in the PE transaction data, corporate tax rates by 
country were collected to extract the influence of incremental tax shield in value 
creation. Corporate tax rates were collected from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) database, which included tax rates for 
European countries from year 2000. Following Acharya et al. (2012), we used 
average corporate tax rate during the holding period in the country of portfolio 
company’s headquarters. Since tax rates before 2000 were not available, tax rates 
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of year 2000 were used for the years before 2000 when calculating average tax rate 
during holding period for the few investments entered in the ‘90s. If the tax rate 
was not available for other reason, we used a fixed tax rate of 35%, following 
Phalippou & Zollo (2005).  
 
Exchange rates were collected to convert PE transaction data that was reported in 
various currencies. Using a common base rate for all transactions enabled us to 
remove the effect of exchange rates on value creation of PE transactions. We used 
the euro as the base rate which was a natural choice for European transaction data. 
Furthermore, we used historical exchange rates to convert other currencies to euros. 
Historical exchange rates were collected from a database of European Central Bank 
(ECB).  
3.1.2 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 7 represents the entry years of transactions in both samples. The entry years 
of transactions in full sample ranged from 1990 to 2015, while the most transactions 
were entered before the years of the financial crisis in 2008. In add-on sample, entry 
years ranged from 1999 to 2015. In both samples, the average entry year was 2005.  
 
 
Figure 7 Transactions by entry year 
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Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of both samples. The sample values reveal 
how both enterprise values and equity values grew on average in both samples. The 
mean enterprise and equity values are significantly lower in add-on sample, which 
is caused by the lack of add-on data provided by the GPs of the largest transactions. 
The amount of net debt decreased in full sample, while the mean slightly increased 
in add-on sample. The growth in net debt is partly explained by the additional debt 
raised to finance add-on acquisitions. However, debt/EV ratios decreased in both 
samples indicating that enterprise value growth exceeded debt growth also in add-
on sample on average. EV/EBITDA multiples also raised significantly in both 
samples, which indicate that GPs were able to sell companies at a higher multiple 
than acquired on average. 
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics 
 Full sample (n=297)  Add-on sample (n=75) 
  Mean Median Std. Dev.   Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 Holding period 4.43 3.92 2.29  4.14 3.77 2.06 
 Times money 3.15 1.86 4.98  2.64 1.89 2.54 
 IRR 0.53 0.32 1.04  0.42 0.39 0.42 
 Public peer group size 53.23 21.00 87.68  66.44 26.00 105.73 
        
 Enterprise value (€m entry) 438.3 58.0 1194.6  103.3 57.2 106.7 
 Enterprise value (€m exit) 596.7 146.6 1167.3  231.9 146.6 235.2 
 Equity value (€m entry) 150.4 28.8 310.6  47.7 36.2 40.5 
 Equity value (€m exit) 359.9 89.5 766.1  167.0 100.2 168.6 
 Net debt (€m entry) 288.0 27.0 930.5  55.5 24.8 74.6 
 Net debt (€m exit) 236.8 24.6 538.1  64.9 24.0 91.8 
 EV/EBITDA multiple (entry) 7.33 6.69 4.02  8.42 7.42 5.15 
 EV/EBITDA multiple (exit) 9.01 8.40 6.91  11.20 9.23 6.96 
 Debt/EV ratio (entry) 0.55 0.60 0.25  0.44 0.52 0.30 
 Debt/EV ratio (exit) 0.32 0.25 0.29  0.26 0.30 0.20 
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3.2 Variables 
Several assumptions needed to be made regarding the variables used at different 
stages of the data analysis process, and many related to the limitations of our 
dataset. First, our dataset only contained net debt values, while debt information 
was needed when calculating leverage ratios. Thus, an assumption needed to be 
made that net debt equals debt for all transactions. In practice, this means that cash 
and cash equivalents were assumed to be zero when calculating leverage. Although 
the effect of this assumption can not be expected to be intrinsically significant, it 
also has an effect on the equity values, which were calculated as the remainder of 
EV and net debt. Change in net debt was also used to estimate the generated free 
cash flow during a holding period. In addition to paying off debt and increasing 
cash and cash equivalents, the portfolio companies are likely to pay dividends 
during the holding period to its shareholders. However, our dataset did not contain 
data about dividends and thus those could not be included in the calculation of free 
cash flow.  
 
One critical element of the IVC 2.0 framework is the separation of organic and 
inorganic value creation, which can be done in several ways. Usually, inorganic 
growth is assumed to be captured at the time of acquisition, and synergies as well 
as organic growth in acquired companies to be part of organic growth of the 
platform. However, one could also assume that the synergies and organic growth of 
acquired companies would be part of inorganic growth, since those would not have 
emerged without the acquisitions. This resembles the definition of intrinsic value 
creation introduced by Berg and Gottschalg (2005). Without having the detailed 
growth of each add-on company, we could have assumed equal percentual growth 
for portfolio company and acquired companies, and thus come up with an estimate 
of the second approach. However, to respect the original methodology (Zeisberger 
et al. 2016), we followed the common and simpler practice of capturing inorganic 
growth at the time of acquisitions. 
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Due to the methodology to capture inorganic growth, organic growth was calculated 
by subtracting acquired EV, net debt, sales and EBITDA values from the 
corresponding values of the portfolio company at exit. Value creation was 
separately calculated for organic and inorganic growth, as we will present in chapter 
3.3.2. In an optimal situation, one would have data of the portfolio company before 
and after (pro forma) of each add-on acquisition to capture inorganic growth  (Duff 
& Phelps 2014). However, our dataset only contained a sum of acquired values 
without dates or financial information of individual add-ons, and this forced us to 
make some assumptions. First, we assumed that the organic growth in portfolio 
company was linear during holding period. Second, we assumed that add-ons 
occurred in the middle of holding period on average. Using these assumptions, we 
were able to calculate valuation metrics of the portfolio company before and after 
add-on acquisitions and thus separate inorganic value creation.  
 
Our manner to segregate incremental leverage and its contribution to value creation 
also merits comment. Previous studies, such as Puche et al. (2015), use average 
debt-to-equity ratio during holding period to separate the contribution of 
incremental leverage as introduced in chapter 2.4.1. However, we used the debt-to-
EV ratio at entry since it better illustrates the risk appetite of GPs. Furthermore, 
using average debt-to-equity ratios led to several issues when separating inorganic 
growth and the contribution of industry. It could be argued that exit leverage ratios 
are subject to the generation of FCF, paying off debt and GPs’ focus to sell the 
company rather than GPs’ decision of maintaining a certain level of leverage. Using 
debt at entry of the investments thus better capitalizes the intended risk level of a 
GP and incremental effect when compared to industry peers. Furthermore, the 
manner in which previous studies have calculated average debt-to-equity ratios 
results in a biased view of the average debt during holding period as illustrated in 
the example calculation of chapter 3.3.2. 
 
The assumptions regarding industry peer group selection also merit attention. First, 
we used standard industry classification (SIC) codes to match peer group companies 
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with each transaction. SIC is a commonly used classification code among industry 
classification benchmark (ICB) which used by some other authors, such as 
Achleitner et al. (2011). We used the primary three-digit SIC code of a portfolio 
company to match peer group companies, but we reduced the length of SIC code 
up to one if comparable public companies were not found. The lack of companies 
was mostly caused by the significant differences in the sizes of different three-digit 
categories, and thus the relevance of peer group barely deteriorated when using 
shorter SIC codes.  
 
While previous studies have not reported information about peer group sizes, we 
used five comparable companies as the minimum requirement for peer group 
selection. Furthermore, in addition to SIC codes, and entry and exit dates, we used 
Europe as the criteria for peer group companies. As suggested by Zeisberger et al. 
(2016) and Duff & Phelps (2014), we used weighted average values of peer group 
when calculating growth rates in various financial measures of industry. Thus, 
industry values can be seen as an alternative investment option in a weighted group 
of public comparable companies. This differs from the methodology of Achleitner 
et al. (2011) who used a median of industry. The means, medians and standard 
deviations of peer groups can be seen in the descriptive statistics of chapter 3.1.2. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 IVC 2.0 framework 
IVC 2.0 is a framework to decompose value creation and to allocate value creation 
to various sources of funding. The framework measures value creation across 
operational and financial levers separating the sources and causes of value creation. 
First, it generates a baseline investment return which illustrates the value that would 
have been generated with the capital structure of the average industry participant. 
In practice, this represents an investment in the portfolio company with a leverage 
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ratio equal to the prevailing market value of the company at entry. Baseline 
investment is then divided into four categories of value creation: revenue, margin, 
multiple and cash flow. The four categories are further divided into changes in 
average industry participant, acquired value and alpha, which measures the 
abnormal value creation after controlling for industry change and add-on 
acquisitions. In multiple category, an additional lever is added to quantify the 
impact of multiple arbitrage resulting from differences in valuation multiples of 
parent and target companies. (Zeisberger et al. 2016) 
 
The difference between baseline return and change in investment value is captured 
with the fifth category: capital structure. As high leverage is peculiar to buyouts 
aiming to boost equity returns, this category captures the effect of having more debt 
than the industry on average. Alternatively, a leverage ratio below industry average 
is captured with reduced return on equity due to increased equity financing. Capital 
structure effect is further divided into the effects of incremental interest expenses, 
incremental tax shield and total leverage effect. Since the five categories of 
framework measure the value creation to 100% equity owners, the framework 
further divides the change in total investment value into different sources of 
funding. (Zeisberger et al. 2016)  
 
It should be noted that the methodology used in this thesis might not be precisely 
consistent with the original framework introduced by Zeisberger et al. (2016). 
Despite the introduction of the framework (Zeisberger et al. 2016) and our 
discussion with Mr. Bowen White – one of the authors – vague guidelines and lack 
of clear explanation about the several assumptions needed in the calculations might 
have resulted in small differences. Furthermore, the limitations of our dataset 
compelled us to make assumptions that may not be exactly aligned with the original 
framework. On the other hand, we aim to improve some of the expected limitations 
of the framework and develop a more comprehensive understanding of value 
creation by introducing persistence perspective. Due to the complexity of the 
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framework, the methodology is presented through an example calculation of a 
fictional transaction in the following chapter 3.3.2.  
 
To calculate value creation attribution, we build and used a python script to enable 
efficient data processing. The script was built to connect various sources of data 
and calculate the starting values of each transaction. Furthermore, the script 
matched comparable public companies with each transaction to calculate 
corresponding growth rates in the industry. Finally, the script calculated value 
creation attribution for each transaction according to the methodology of the 
following chapter.  
3.3.2 Example calculation 
The fictional transaction of this chapter introduces the methodology of the IVC 2.0 
framework used in this thesis. Table 6 present financial measures of the fictional 
portfolio company at entry, during holding period and at exit. Enterprise value of 
the company is assumed to be EUR 100 million, the value of debt to be EUR 50 
million, which equals to an equity value of EUR 50 million and a debt/EV ratio of 
0.5 (50/100). Sales of the company are assumed to be EUR 100 million and earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to be EUR 10 
million. Given these assumptions, EBITDA/sales margin is 10% (10/100) and 
EV/EBITDA multiple 10 (100/10). The fictional acquisition was executed 1/1/2012 
and a PE fund acquired 70% of the company.  
 
During holding period, the company paid EUR 10 million dividends to its 
shareholders and PE firm executed an investment of  EUR 10 million to finance 
add-on acquisitions. Estimated interest rate was 9.0% during the holding period of 
4 years, resulting in a total cost of debt of 41.2% ((1 + 0.09)^(4) – 1). Average tax 
rate during the holding period was 30%.  
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Table 6 Transaction values 
 Entry 
Holding 
period Exit Acquired 
Organic 
delta 
Enterprise value (€m) 100  165 25 40 
Equity (€m) 50  140 15 75 
Debt/net debt (€m) 50  25 10 -35 
Sales (€m) 100  120 10 10 
EBITDA (€m) 10  15 2 3 
EBITDA/Sales 10.0 %  12.5 % 20.0 % 1.8 % 
EV/EBITDA 10.0x  11.0x 12.5x 0.8x 
Free cash flow (€m)     45 
Debt/EV 0.50     
Dividends (€m)  10    
Capital Injections (€m)  15    
Interest rate  9%    
Holding period [years] 01/01/2012 4.0 01/01/2016   
Cost of debt  41.2 %    
Tax rate  30.0 %    
PE ownership 70%     
 
At exit, the company’s equity value had increased to 140 million and value of debt 
to EUR 25 million, equalling to an enterprise value of EUR 165 million. Sales grew 
to EUR 20 million and EBITDA to EUR 15 million, resulting in EBITDA/sales 
margin of 12.5% (15/120) and EV/EBITDA multiple of 11 (15/165) at exit. Part of 
the growth, however, was achieved as a result of add-on acquisition executed during 
the holding period, reducing the organic growth of the portfolio company. A total 
enterprise value of EUR 25 million was acquired, of which EUR 15 million was 
financed with additional debt and EUR 10 million with equity injections of PE 
investor. Total acquired sales were EUR 10 million and EBITDA EUR 2 million, 
resulting in EBITDA/Sales margin of 20.0% (2/10) and EV/EBITDA multiple of 
12.5 (25/2) for the acquired entity.  
 
The organic delta column of table 6 presents the organic growth in financial 
measures after subtracting the effect of add-on acquisitions. For example, organic 
delta in equity value was EUR 80 million ((140 – 50) – 10) and organic growth in 
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EBITDA EUR 3 million ((15 – 10) – 2). Total free cash flow of a company’s organic 
activities is calculated as the sum of change in net debt and dividends paid to 
shareholders (40 + 10 = 50).  
 
To separate inorganic value creation resulting from add-on acquisitions, the value 
of the portfolio company is needed both before the acquisition and right after 
acquiring the company (pro forma). Table 7 represents how the framework captures 
inorganic value creation. At the time of acquisition, the enterprise value of the 
company was EUR 120 million, consisting of EUR 88 million of equity and EUR 
33 million of debt. Sales were EUR 105 million and EBITDA EUR 11.5 million 
resulting in EBITDA/Sales margin of 11.0% and EV/EBITDA multiple of 10.  
 
Table 7 Acquired values 
 Acquired Parent Pro forma Delta 
Enterprise value (€m) 25 120 145 25 
Equity (€m) 15 88 103 15 
Debt/net debt (€m) 10 32.5 42.5 10 
Sales (€m) 10 105 115 10 
EBITDA (€m) 2 11.5 13.5 2 
EBITDA/Sales 20.0 % 11.0 % 11.7 % 0.8 % 
EV/EBITDA 12.5x 10.4x 10.7x 0.3x 
PE ownership 15%  60%  
 
The values after add-on acquisitions (pro forma) have calculated as the sum of the 
corresponding values of parent and acquired entities. EBITDA/Sales margin and 
EV/EBITDA multiple values have been calculated from the underlying values. 
Delta column captures the changes in parent company resulting from the add-on 
acquisitions. Furthermore, the ownership of initial investment is diluted as a 
consequence of issuing new shares to equity injectors. The ownership of follow-on 
funder is 15% (15/103) while the ownership of initial PE investment decreases to 
60% (70%*88/103).  
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Table 8 presents the financial values of comparable public companies during the 
holding period of the fictional investment. Enterprise value, equity, debt and sales 
values are presented as the sums of all comparable public companies found based 
on the matching criteria presented in chapter 3.2. In this example, the total 
enterprise value of public peers was EUR 3,000 million, total equity EUR 2,000 
million, debt EUR 1,000 million, sales EUR 2,000 million and EBITDA EUR 400 
million at entry, resulting in weighted average EBITDA/Sales margin of 20.0%and 
EV/EBITDA multiple of 7.5 at entry. At the exit year of investment, the total 
enterprise value was EUR 3,200 million, equity EUR 2,400 million, debt EUR 800 
million, sales EUR 2,200 million and EBITDA EUR 400 million, resulting in 
EBITDA/Sales margin of 18.2% and EV/EBITDA multiple of 8.0. Delta column 
captures the changes in each value during the holding period of the investment. 
Furthermore, the total free cash flow during holding period was EUR 300 million, 
which consisted of change in net debt and dividends paid during the holding period 
(200 + 100).  
 
Table 8 Industry values 
 Entry 
Holding 
period Exit Delta 
Enterprise value (€m) 3000  3200 200 
Equity (€m) 2000  2400 400 
Debt/net debt (€m) 1000  800 -200 
Sales (€m) 2000  2200 200 
EBITDA (€m) 400  400 0 
EBITDA/Sales 20.0 %  18.2 % -1.8 % 
EV/EBITDA 7.5x  8.0x 0.5x 
Free cash flow (€m)  300   
Debt/EV 0.33    
Dividends (€m)  100   
 
Tables 6–8 present all financial values of the fictional transaction during different 
times of holding period needed in the calculations of the methodology. Table 9 
below illustrates how value creation was attributed to different equity holders and 
how the incremental effect of leverage was captured. First, the total change in 
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investment value was captured as a sum of organic change in equity value and 
dividends. Investment value was further divided into different equity owners 
according to diluted ownerships at exit.  
 
Table 9 Change in investment value and baseline return 
  EUR m 
TM 
points 
∆ Investment Value 85.0 1.3 
   Other investors 21.6 0.3 
   Follow-on 12.4 0.2 
   Initial 51.0 0.8 
Capital Structure 21.3 0.3 
   Leverage Effect 24.9 0.4 
   Tax Shield 1.5 0.0 
   Interest -5.1 -0.1 
∆ Baseline 63.8 1.0 
 
To extract the effect of incremental debt, baseline investment return was extracted 
by applying the capital structure of average industry participant to the portfolio 
company. In practice, this represents an investment in the portfolio company with 
a leverage ratio equal to prevailing market value at entry. We calculated the 
investment ratio using the following formula: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
1 +  
𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝑉𝑡
1 +  
𝐷𝑖
𝐸𝑉𝑖
, where 
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝑉𝑡
 = debt to enterprise value ratio of portfolio company 
𝐷𝑖
𝐸𝑉𝑖
 = weighted average debt to enterprise value ratio of industry. 
 
In the case of our fictional transaction, the investment ratio was 75%                            
((1 + 0.5)/(1 + 0.33)). Thus, the enterprise value of the fictional investment at entry 
would be EUR 75 million (100*0.75%) and debt EUR 25 million (75 – 50), 
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resulting from the original equity value of EUR 50 million. By applying the 
investment ratio to the total investment returns, baseline return can be calculated 
using the following formula: 
 
Baseline return = Investment ratio * (change in equity + dividends), 
 
which in this case results in a baseline return of EUR 63.8 million (75%*(75 + 10)). 
The capital structure effect is captured as the difference between change in 
investment value and baseline return, resulting in a capital structure effect of EUR 
21.3 million in the case example. Since incremental debt has also resulted in higher 
interest expenses, an additional lever is added to extract the effect of incremental 
cost of debt on value creation. Furthermore, tax shield lever captures the effect of 
reduced interest expenses due to tax shield using transaction specific tax rate. The 
net effect of incremental debt and tax shield is captured as FCF effect. The increased 
return on capital due to reduced equity financing is then captured with leverage 
effect driver. TM values were calculated by dividing monetary value creation by 
the total invested capital. 
 
It should be noted that the way in which the framework captures incremental debt 
is significantly different from the methodologies presented in previous literature. 
For example, the formula of Achleitner et al. (2010) presented in chapter 2.4.1 is 
based on estimated average debt-to-equity ratio during the holding period. It could 
be argued that the manner in which their methodology captures incremental debt is 
thus subject to a portfolio company’s ability to create FCF and pay off debt during 
the holding period rather than GPs decision as in the case of IVC 2.0 framework, 
which uses debt/EV ratio at entry. Furthermore, for example Puche et al. (2015) 
calculate average the debt-to-equity ratio simply as the average of entry and exit 
debt-to-equity ratios, which often results in biased results of average debt. For 
example, in our case, their method to capture average D/E would result in a ratio of 
0.56 while using average equity and average debt to calculate the ratio would result 
in 0.37. Furthermore, the severity of the consequences of their simplification 
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increases when D/E ratios are compared to industry averages to capture incremental 
debt.  
 
By applying the investment ratio to the financial values of the portfolio company, 
baseline return can be divided into different sources of value. Our methodology to 
capture the effect of total revenue, margin, multiple and cash flow reminds the more 
conventional method of Puche et al. (2015). First, the cash flow driver can be 
calculated using investment ratio and FCF generated during holding period, 
resulting in EUR 33.8 million (75%*45). Cash flow driver is divided into industry 
and alpha drivers by comparing the company’s free cash flow generation to the 
average of industry peers. The original idea of IVC 2.0 framework is to make this 
division by comparing annual cash flow growth rates (Write et al. 2016). Since we 
did not have annual free cash flow information in our data, we had to come up with 
an alternative way to compare a transaction to industry. We used a ratio between 
annual average FCF during holding period and entry sales to get comparable rates 
between a transaction and industry. In our case example, the ratio was 11.3% for 
the transaction and 3.8% for the group of industry peers. Thus, 33% (3.8%/11.8%) 
of FCF generation was attributed to industry while the remaining 67% was 
attributed to alpha.  
 
The total contributions of margin, revenue and multiple were captured in a 
conventional manner. For example, the contribution of multiple was captured by 
multiplying the entry EBITDA with the change in multiple and investment ratio 
(10*0.8*75%), resulting in multiple contribution of EUR 5.8 million. The 
contribution of margin and revenue was calculated in a similar manner. The first 
column of table 10 illustrates how the industry leverage adjusted baseline return 
was divided into these drivers. 
 
The contribution of each operational improvement driver was further divided into 
industry and alpha drivers by comparing the annual growth rates between a 
transaction and industry. For example, the annual sales growth rate was 2.4% for 
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both the transaction and industry, and thus revenue growth was fully attributed to 
industry. An exception is made in alpha multiple driver, where value creation is 
further divided into organic and inorganic drivers. Inorganic value creation 
represents multiple arbitrage resulting from the difference between parent’s and 
targets valuation multiples. 
 
Table 10 Value creation attribution of baseline return 
 
EUR m EUR m 
TM 
points 
∆ Baseline 63.8 63.8 1.0 
Cash Flow 33.8 15.0 0.2 
   Alpha 22.5 22.5 0.3 
   Industry 11.3 11.3 0.2 
∆ Multiple 5.8 6.1 0.1 
   Organic 3.8 4.1 0.1 
   Inorganic -3.1 -3.3 -0.1 
   Industry 5.0 5.3 0.1 
Comb. EBITDA & Multiple  1.7   
∆ Margin 13.6 15.4 0.3 
   Alpha 21.2 23.9 0.4 
   Industry -7.5 -8.5 -0.1 
∆ Revenue 7.5 8.5 0.3 
   Alpha 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Industry 7.5 8.5 0.1 
Comb. Revenue & Margin 1.4     
 
As discussed in chapter 2.4.1, simultaneous changes in EBITDA and multiple, and 
margin and revenue result in combination effects. While these effects are often 
baked into main drivers causing biased results or reported as separate drivers (see 
for example Puche et al. 2015), we decided to follow an alternative approach. Since 
reporting these values as separate drivers would have increased the complexity of 
the framework and thus made it more difficult to understand, we decided not to 
report these as separate drivers, following also the idea of the original IVC 2.0 
framework (Zeisberger et al. 2016). However, the Zeisberger et al. (2016) do not 
report how combination effects should be treated and it is thus likely that these 
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effects are baked into main drivers. For example, common industry practice is to 
allocate combination effect resulting from simultaneous changes in multiple and 
EBITDA to multiple driver, which overstates the contribution of this driver 
(Zeisberger et al. 2016). To avoid this bias, we allocated the combination effects to 
all underlying drivers according to their original contributions, as can be seen in the 
second column of table 10. For example, the total contribution of organic multiple 
driver increased from EUR 3.8 million to EUR 4.1 million as a result of 
combination effect allocation (3.8 + 1.7*(3.8/(5.8 + 13.6 + 7.5)) = 4.1). Although 
this methodology could be criticized, we were able to simplify the methodology 
and respect the relative contribution of each driver. 
 
While the previous calculation represents the organic value creation of a 
transaction, the acquired value creation was separately calculated. Table 11 below 
illustrates how acquired value creation was captured from the acquired values of 
table 7. In general, acquired value creation was calculated similarly as organic value 
creation. Also, the combination effect of acquisitions was separately calculated and 
allocated to underlying drivers according to their contribution in the first column of 
table 11. The IVC 2.0 framework assumes that acquired multiple, margin and 
revenue components are offset by the financing of the acquisitions. Thus, the only 
acquired driver creating value is the multiple arbitrage driver resulting from the 
difference between the valuation multiples of acquired entities and parent company. 
In our example, the acquired multiple was 12.4 versus a multiple of 10.4 of the 
parent company, which resulted in a negative multiple arbitrage effect of EUR -3.3 
million or TM of -0.1.  
 
  
 58 
Table 11 Inorganic value creation 
 
EUR m EUR m 
TM 
points 
Acquisition Finance -18.8 -18.8 -0.3 
   Multiple arbitrage -3.3 -3.3 -0.1 
   Multiple 2.6 2.7 0.0 
   Comb. EBITDA & Multiple  0.5   
   Margin 6.5 6.9 0.1 
   Revenue 8.6 9.1 0.1 
   Comb. Revenue & Margin 0.6     
 
Figure 8 illustrates the total value creation of the fictional transaction. In practice, 
it merges the organic and acquired value creation represented in tables 9–11, using 
TM as a unit. TM values were calculated by dividend the monetary contributions 
with total invested capital, which consists of entry equity and additional capital 
injections during the holding period (50 + 15 = 65).  
 
 
Figure 8 Value creation of the fictional transaction 
 
In the example transaction, the net effect of using higher leverage than industry 
represented 25% (0.33/1.31) of total value creation. The remaining 75% of value 
creation was generated with operational improvements and multiple expansion. The 
most significant driver was margin improvement (0.34), while the contribution of 
revenue growth was also remarkable (0.27). However, a closer examination of the 
sources of these drivers reveals that the difference in GP specific contributions 
(alpha) was even greater. Alpha margin contribution was 0.37 and industry margin 
-0.13 indicating that the transaction outperformed industry peers significantly in 
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margin improvements. In revenue growth, however, alpha revenue was zero 
meaning equal growth in portfolio company and industry.  
 
The total contribution of multiple growth on value creation was 0.14. Despite the 
negative multiple arbitrage effect resulting from add-on acquisitions, the total alpha 
contribution was positive (0.06). Acquisitions also increased the multiple of the 
platform resulting in a contribution of 0.04. The significant multiple growth in the 
industry resulted in an industry multiple contribution of 0.08. The total effect of 
FCF after subtracting the financing of acquisitions was 0.23. The majority of FCF 
generation was attributed to alpha, resulting in a contribution of 0.35 compared to 
industry driver of 0.17.   
3.3.3 Measuring persistence 
Scholars studying performance persistence have introduced several alternative 
methodologies to examine the ability of GP to exhibit constant performance. 
Studies focusing on quartile performance have used Markov transition matrices (see 
for example Aigner et al. 2008 and Harris et al. 2014a), which measure the 
likelihood of a GP’s follow-on fund to stay in the same or move to other 
performance quartile compared to the GP’s precedent fund. This methodology thus 
separates the persistence between top and low-performing funds, highlighting the 
difference of persistence between different performance levels. 
 
Most commonly, researchers have studied persistence using correlations of two 
consecutive funds of a GP (Braun et al. 2017b, Buchner et al. 2016). However, this 
methodology only measures the correlation between two data points – either the 
performance of a fund or the return of individual transaction – thus focusing only 
on short term persistence (Braun et al. 2017b). To mitigate this issue, some authors 
have studied the correlation with the funds before the preceding fund (see for 
example Kaplan and Schoar 2005). At deal-level, however, too many preceding 
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transactions would be needed to understand the long term persistence of a GP. 
Furthermore, since we have several value creation drivers instead of the total return 
of a fund or transaction, this approach would result in far too complex results. 
 
To enable studying the persistence of several value creation drivers, we selected the 
approach of Braun et al. (2017b). They study the fixed effect of a GP on the 
variation of a specific driver to determine how much of the variation is explained 
by the GP of a transaction. First, we use standard deviation to demonstrate the 
volatility of a driver in general: 
 
𝜎𝑟 = √
∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑟 − ?̅?𝑟)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛 − 1
, where 
 
𝜎𝑟 = standard deviation of driver r, 
𝑥𝑖𝑟 = value contribution of transaction i with driver r, 
?̅?𝑟 = mean contribution of driver r, 
𝑛 = sample size. 
 
To extract the fixed effect of GP, we subtract the average contribution of a GP from 
each driver value to separate the variation within GPs from the variation between 
GPs: 
 
𝜎𝑟 = √
∑ ((𝑥𝑖𝑟
𝑚 − ?̅?𝑟
𝑚) − ?̅?𝑟)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛 − 1
, where 
 
𝜎𝑟 = standard deviation of driver r, 
𝑥𝑖𝑟
𝑚 = value contribution of transaction i of GP m with driver r, 
?̅?𝑟
𝑚 = mean contribution of driver r in the transactions of GP m, 
?̅?𝑟 = mean contribution of driver r, 
𝑛 = sample size. 
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Furthermore, since the mean contributions of drivers vary significantly, we divide 
the standard deviation with the mean contribution of a driver to have comparable 
persistence measures for different sized value creation drivers. Since some 
contributions are negative, we use the means of absolute values of contributions. 
The resulting value is the coefficient of variation (CV), which we use as the measure 
of persistence: 
 
𝐶𝑉𝑟 =
𝜎𝑟
∑ |𝑥𝑖𝑟|
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
, where 
 
𝜎𝑟 = standard deviation of driver r, 
𝑥𝑖𝑟 = value contribution of transaction i with driver r, 
𝑛 = sample size. 
 
We calculate the values of CV both before and after controlling for the fixed effect 
of GP, to understand the total variation in a driver’s contribution and the average 
variation within GPs. Furthermore, we use the ratio of the two CVs to illustrate how 
much of the variation is explained by the differences between GPs and how much 
of it remains within GPs. To validate the reliability of our results, we use F-test to 
estimate the two-tailed probability that the differences in standard deviations before 
and after GP fixed effect are not significantly different.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Value creation 
4.1.1 Full sample 
Figure 9 shows the average value creation of the full sample containing 297 private 
equity transactions. The average change in investment value was 3.15, which means 
that on average, the equity values of the companies have more than quadrupled 
under PE ownership. The average return is in line with the results of Puche et al. 
(2015), whose final sample of over 1,300 European transactions yielded a TM of 
3.3. 59% (1.87/3.15) of the change in investment value captured by initial 
investment and only 0.3% through follow-on funding. Remaining 40% was 
captured by other investors, such as portfolio companies’ management.  
 
In line with the results of the previous studies, a great share of value creation was 
achieved by using more leverage than industry peers. On average, incremental 
leverage yielded a TM of 1.27, accounting for 40% of the total value creation. The 
relative share of incremental leverage is in line with the findings of previous studies 
(Acharya et al. 2012, Ernst & Young 2014, Puche et al. 2015), although the previous 
results are not fully comparable due to methodological differences to extract the 
contribution of incremental leverage. The total leverage effect in our sample was 
1.53, but a TM of 0.36 was captured by debt holders. Tax shield increased the 
returns with a TM of 0.10 on average. 
 
Incremental debt financing decreased baseline – value creation with average 
industry leverage – to a TM of 1.88. This means that in theory, the companies would 
still have almost tripled in size during PE ownership if financed with the average 
capital structure of the industry. The generation of cash flow had a low contribution 
to value creation, averaging 0.10. The role of generating FCF in our sample was 
 63 
thus significantly lower than in the sample of Puche et al. (2015) who averaged a 
contribution of 0.4 for European transactions. However, our methodology reveals 
that portfolio companies were still generating significantly more cash flow than 
public comparable companies: industry FCF contribution was only 0.02 while alpha 
FCF was 0.08.  
 
 
Figure 9 Average value creation attribution of full sample 
 
Multiple improvement was the largest single value creation driver with a 
contribution of 0.70. With a relative contribution of 22% (0.70/3.15), the 
contribution of multiple change is a little higher than the multiple effect of 15% 
reported by Puche et al. (2015), although part of the difference is attributable to 
separately reported combination effect of 6%. Our results show that the contribution 
of industry multiple growth was only 0.11 while alpha multiple contribution was 
0.59 in total. Most of the alpha (0.53) was attributable to organic multiple growth 
indicating that GPs are able to increase valuation multiples more on average than 
public comparable companies. Furthermore, inorganic multiple contribution of 0.06 
indicates that GPs are able to increase the multiples of acquired entities as part of 
the platform of portfolio company.  
 
Margin improvement was another significant value creation driver with an average 
contribution of 0.45. Margin improvements were fully attributable to alpha, leaving 
zero contribution to industry on average. The results indicate that while GPs 
invested in industries where public comparable companies did not improve 
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profitability on average, GPs were able to create significant value by improving 
profitability. The relative contribution of 14% (0.45/3.15) is slightly higher than 
margin effect of 8% and combination effect of 1% reported by Puche et al. (2015).  
 
Increasing the revenues of portfolio companies contributed a TM of 0.62 to value 
creation on average. The relative contribution of 20% (0.62/3.15) is lower than 27% 
reported by Puche et al. (2015). The role of industry development was the greatest 
in revenue driver: almost half of the value created through increasing revenue was 
attributable to growing industry (0.30) while remaining 0.32 was attributable to 
alpha. This means that PE-backed companies were still able to grow revenue more 
than twice as fast as public peers but were also able to select target companies from 
growing industries.  
 
In addition to organic value creation, portfolio companies executed add-on 
acquisitions to create value. Figure 10 reports the value creation of add-on 
acquisitions. The results reveal that a significant amount of revenue growth was 
achieved with add-on acquisitions, equalling to a contribution of 0.12. Margin 
contribution was 0.00 indicating that acquired companies were equally profitable 
as platform companies on average, thus not creating value at the time of acquisition. 
Despite the manner of the framework to capture acquired value at the time of 
acquisition, part of alpha margin can be expected to be attributable to synergies 
realized by the add-ons, thus increasing the value created with add-on acquisitions.  
 
 
Figure 10 Average inorganic value creation of full sample 
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The contribution of multiple was -0.02 indicating that add-on acquisition had a 
small negative effect on portfolio companies' valuation multiple on average. The 
contributions of acquired revenue, margin and multiple are fully offset with 
acquisition financing since they are not considered to create value in the framework. 
Instead, multiple arbitrage is the only inorganic value creation driver, which 
averaged a TM of 0.06 in our sample. The contribution of multiple arbitrage is thus 
only inorganic value creation driver in the value bridge of graph 9.  
 
While the previously introduced results reveal interesting insights about value 
creation in a large sample of PE transactions, the partly missing add-on data of 
transactions cause minor bias in the results. In practice, lack of add-on data results 
in the allocation of conceivable add-ons into different levers of alpha, overstating 
these organic value creation drivers and thus the outperformance of GPs over public 
peers. Furthermore, the lack of information about conceivable equity injections 
used to fund add-on acquisitions increases the total TM returns of equity owners. 
To avoid these issues, we will next analyse the subset of transactions containing 
full information about add-ons.   
4.1.2 Add-on sample 
Add-on sample consists of the 75 transactions of full sample, where full add-on data 
was available. In 51 of these transactions, one or more add-ons were executed while 
zero add-ons were reported for the remaining 24 transactions. The total change in 
investment value was 2.64 on average, which is lower than the average of full 
sample, but expected due to capital injections used to fund add-ons. 67% 
(1.77/2.64) of the value creation was captured by PE investors, of which 2% 
(0.04/1.73) was attributable to follow-on funding. Remaining 33% was captured by 
other investors. The average value creation of add-on sample can be seen in figure 
11. 
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Figure 11 Average value creation attribution of add-on sample 
 
The average contribution of leverage was significantly lower than in full sample. 
This may be due to the significantly lower average enterprise value of full sample, 
causing decreased access to debt financing. The results of Puche et al. (2015) could 
explain the phenomenon since they show that the contribution of leverage is 
significantly higher in larger transactions. The total effect of leverage was 0.82, of 
which 0.27 was paid as interest expenses and 0.08 was saved as reduced taxes. After 
controlling for industry leverage, transactions yielded a baseline of 2.01 on average, 
meaning tripling the equity value of portfolio companies on average.  
 
The contribution of cash flow in add-on sample was 0.21, the majority of which 
was attributable to alpha. While the relative contribution was higher than in full 
sample, it was still lower than the average reported by Puche et al. (2015). Multiple 
growth was the largest contributor to value creation with a TM of 0.81. Closer 
examination of the causes of multiple growth reveals that majority of multiple 
growth was achieved through alpha, leaving only a TM of 0.03 to industry 
contribution. Alpha multiple of 0.78 was achieved through both organic multiple 
growth and multiple arbitrage, and organic growth represented roughly two-thirds 
of the total alpha contribution. The results indicate that GPs are able either to buy 
with cheaper or sell with higher multiples than market on average. Furthermore, 
GPs are able to create value by integrating add-on targets with lower valuation 
multiples as a part of the platform of a portfolio company.   
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The contribution of revenue growth and margin improvement were roughly equal 
in add-on sample with contributions of 0.51 and 0.48, respectively. Margin 
improvements in portfolio companies were significantly higher than in public peers 
which decreased EBITDA margin on average. The contribution of alpha was 0.53 
while industry yielded a negative contribution of -0.05 on average. Revenue growth 
driver was more equally split to industry and alpha drivers with contributions of 
0.23 and 0.28, respectively. The results indicate that on average GPs are able to 
select targets from growing industries but not from industries where profitability is 
expected to grow on average.  
 
Rearranging value creation to three sources of value reveals the importance of alpha 
in value creation. Figure 12 shows that the total contribution of alpha was 1.77 on 
average while industry growth contributed only a total of 0.24. The largest driver 
of alpha was the change in valuation multiple, which resulted in a total average TM 
of 0.77. The second largest driver was margin with a contribution of 0.53. Thus, 
almost 75% of the leverage-adjusted outperformance is explained by multiple 
growth and margin improvement. The result is interesting and partly conflicting 
with the previous finding suggesting that GPs focus on revenue growth rather than 
margin improvements (Kaserer 2011, Puche et al. 2015).  
 
  
Figure 12 Rearranged value creation of add-on sample 
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Figure 13 reveals the contribution of add-ons in value creation. The average 
contribution of acquired revenue growth was significant, equalling to an acquired 
revenue driver of 0.48. Acquired margin contribution was zero on average meaning 
that the profitability of add-ons was equal to portfolio companies on average. The 
contribution of acquired multiple was negative on average, which indicates that 
add-ons decreased the valuation multiples of platforms on average. The three 
drivers were offset by the financing of acquisitions. Despite the negative effect of 
acquired multiple, the contribution of multiple arbitrage was 0.24, representing the 
only inorganic value driver in the value bridge of figure 12 and figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 Inorganic value creation of add-on sample 
 
Figure 14 combines the organic value creation of figure 11 with the acquired values 
of figure 13. The value bridge reveals that roughly a half (0.48/0.99) of revenue 
growth in portfolio companies was achieved through inorganic revenue growth. The 
actual contribution of GP was thus relatively low, representing only 28% 
(0.28/0.99) of total revenue contribution. However, in margin improvements, the 
contribution of organic alpha was remarkable, representing 110% (0.53/0.48) of 
margin value creation. In multiple growth, add-ons decreased the multiples of 
platforms on average, but multiple arbitrages raised the net multiple effects of add-
ons to positive. 
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Figure 14 Full value creation attribution of add-on sample 
 
Due to the methodology of IVC 2.0 framework to capture inorganic value creation 
at the time of acquisition, the actual contribution of add-on acquisitions is likely to 
be greater than value contribution of multiple arbitrage. For example, the 
integration of add-ons as a part of the platform of portfolio companies is likely to 
result in synergies, which are captured by alpha margin driver. Thus, a part of the 
alpha margin driver is likely to be achieved as an indirect consequence of add-ons. 
Our results could explain the findings of Söffge and Braun (2018) who found that 
revenue growth is a significant driver only for organic deals. Our result indicates 
that while a significant part of revenue growth is acquired – and thus does not create 
value itself – the value is captured as margin improvements resulting from capturing 
cost synergies.  
 
Furthermore, as add-ons increase the size of the portfolio company and thus can be 
expected to decrease the bankruptcy risk of the platform on average, add-ons are 
likely to contribute to organic multiple growth. Thus, the contribution of GPs’ skill 
to negotiate lower multiples at entry and higher multiples at exit is likely to be 
smaller than the organic multiple driver. For example, Achleitner et al. (2011) found 
sales growth to have a positive effect on exit multiples which supports this result.  
 
In general, both samples highlight the role of incremental leverage and multiple 
expansion in value creation. Also, the contributions of revenue growth and margin 
improvements are significant, while the generation of FCF seems to have a minor 
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role in value creation. When examining the GP specific drivers, leverage effect is 
the most significant driver while the contributions of multiple growth and margin 
improvement are also significant. Alpha revenue growth and alpha FCF seem to 
have a smaller role in value creation on average. Incremental leverage, multiple 
expansion and margin growth thus appear as the most auspicious drivers when 
examining the persistence of value creation.  
4.2 Persistence 
4.2.1 Volatility of value creation drivers 
While the results of the previous chapter represent the average contributions of each 
value creation driver, it does not reveal how much variation was in the drivers’ 
contributions. The lower the variation, the more a driver could be seen as a 
consequence of a GP’s skill rather than pure luck. Furthermore, there is no reason 
to assume that the contributions of drivers are normally distributed which raises the 
question of whether the mean of a driver is in the middle or closer to one end of the 
distribution.  
 
Figure 13 represents the average contributions and a 95% confidence interval of 
each value creation driver in add-on sample. For simplicity, acquired value creation 
has been removed from this representation. First, total investment value change 
ranged from a negative contribution of -0.4 to 10.4 with the confidence of 95%, and 
thus the mean contribution of 2.6 was significantly closer to the lower end of the 
contribution. This implies that some transactions generate significantly higher 
returns than the average. A similar pattern is present in baseline return, although the 
mean is lower at 2.0. However, the mean contribution of leverage is slightly over 
the middle of the 95% confidence interval. 
 71 
 
Figure 15 Mean contributions and a 95% confidence interval of value creation drivers in add-
on sample 
 
In cash flow and margin drivers, the mean contribution is close to the middle of the 
distributions. This implies, that the medians of these distributions are close to mean 
value, and at the confidence of 95%, both negative and positive changes from mean 
are roughly equal. While the variations are clearly dependent on the average 
contribution, negative contributions in margin driver seem much more likely than 
in multiple driver, despite the lower mean contribution of margin. In multiple and 
revenue drivers, the sample mean is close to the lower end of the distribution, 
indicating that worst performers are still relatively close to the mean values. On the 
other hand, some transactions have been able to significantly outperform mean 
contributions in multiple expansion and revenue growth.  
 
Since the standard deviations of figure 13 are clearly dependent on mean 
contributions, it would be interesting to examine which drivers’ volatility is low 
compared to the average contribution to identify relative persistence of these 
drivers. Furthermore, the distributions raise questions about whether the variation 
occurs between or within the GPs. For example, the transactions creating 
outperforming returns in multiple expansion and revenue growth might be 
explained by skill of a specific GP or GPs or might be pure luck of selecting high 
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performing targets by random GPs. In the following chapters, we will take a closer 
look into the persistence of these drivers.  
4.2.2 Relative persistence and dependency on GP 
Table 12 below illustrates the coefficient of variation (CV) in different drivers 
before and after controlling for GP fixed effect. Total column represents the 
variation in the total sample while GP fixed effect column captures the average 
variation within GPs. The value of CV for the total return was 1.46 in full sample 
and 0.94 in add-on sample. CVs decreased to 1.35 and 0.85 after controlling for GP 
fixed effect, which indicates that GPs explain variation in total returns to some 
extent. 
 
The CV value of total return is the lowest in both samples, and thus it seems to be 
more persistent than other drivers on average. The only exception is industry 
leverage adjusted baseline return, which CV was 1.40 and 1.27 after controlling for 
GP fixed effect in full sample. The value of 0.10 in the F-test supports the reliability 
of the result. The result indicates that industry leverage adjusted return is more 
persistent driver than total return and might thus be a better predictor of GPs’ ability 
to create value.  
 
Of the five main value creation categories, revenue growth seems to be the most 
persistent value creation driver. The CV value of total revenue driver was 1.67 in 
full sample and 1.08 in add-on sample, while those decreased to 1.55 and 1.00 after 
controlling for GP fixed effect. The sub-drivers of revenue indicate lower 
persistence than the total revenue driver. However, acquired revenue growth seems 
to be the most persistent driver in add-on sample, while the persistence of alpha 
revenue growth seems to be low. Thus, the results indicate that high persistence is 
driven by acquired and industry growth rather than GP specific alpha. The high 
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variation of acquired revenue driver in full sample is explained by the lack of add-
on data in some transactions.  
 
The persistence of capital structure effect, cash flow generation and multiple growth 
seem roughly equal on average. The CVs of capital structure were 1.77 and 1.51 
and decreased to 1.61 and 1.33 after controlling for GP fixed effect. Furthermore, 
the total effect of incremental leverage seems to have even lower volatility both 
before and after controlling for GP fixed effect. The CV in the contribution of cash 
flow was 1.82 and 1.52 and decreased to 1.68 and 1.31 after controlling for GP 
fixed effect. The sub-drivers of cash flow demonstrate even lower persistence than 
total cash flow indicating that to some extent, GPs are able to consistently select 
industries generating significant cash flow and also consistently generate more cash 
flow than industry peers.  
 
The CV for multiple contribution was 1.78 for both samples and decreased to 1.56 
and 1.34 after controlling for GP. The persistence of organic multiple growth was 
even greater indicating that organic multiple growth is more persistent driver than 
total multiple growth. Furthermore, GPs’ ability to select industries with growing 
multiples was more persistent than total multiple growth in full sample. In add-on 
sample, the exploitation of multiple arbitrage and acquired multiple growth also 
showed some indication of persistence. The high variation in the corresponding 
drivers in full sample is explained by the lack of add-on data in some transactions.  
 
Finally, margin growth seemed to be evidently the least persistent driver of the five 
main categories. The CV of total margin effect was 2.27 in full sample and 2.06 for 
full sample, and decreased to 2.17 and 1.98 after controlling for GP fixed effect. 
Within the sub-drivers of margin, most drivers indicated even less persistence. In 
full sample, investing in industries with increasing profitability seemed to be a 
slightly more persistent driver than total margin effect, but variation was still high 
when compared to other categories’ drivers. Add-on sample indicates that GPs’ 
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ability to outperform industry profitability growth and acquiring more profitable 
add-ons were slightly more persistent than total margin effect on average.   
 
Table 12 Coefficient of variation (CV) of value creation drivers 
 
 Coefficient of variation (CV) 
 
 Full sample  Add-on sample 
 
 Total 
Total - 
GP fixed Ratio F-test  Total 
Total - 
GP fixed Ratio F-test 
 ∆ Inv. Value 1.46 1.35 0.93 0.19  0.94 0.85 0.91 0.40 
    Other Investors 1.90 1.80 0.95 0.34  1.38 1.30 0.94 0.62 
    Follow-on 8.08 7.35 0.91 0.11  4.02 3.68 0.92 0.46 
    Initial 1.52 1.38 0.91 0.09  0.98 0.87 0.89 0.30 
 Cap. Structure 1.77 1.61 0.91 0.10  1.51 1.33 0.88 0.26 
    Leverage Effect 1.67 1.50 0.90 0.06  1.43 1.25 0.87 0.24 
    Tax Shield 2.47 2.34 0.95 0.37  1.11 0.89 0.80 0.06 
    Interest 2.44 2.31 0.95 0.35  1.10 0.89 0.81 0.07 
 ∆ Baseline 1.40 1.27 0.91 0.10  1.28 1.04 0.81 0.07 
 Cash Flow 1.82 1.68 0.92 0.17  1.52 1.31 0.86 0.21 
    Acq. Finance 3.32 2.63 0.79 0.00  1.44 1.32 0.92 0.49 
    Alpha 1.87 1.74 0.93 0.23  1.50 1.34 0.89 0.32 
    Industry 1.47 1.36 0.93 0.21  1.42 1.30 0.92 0.48 
 ∆ Multiple 1.78 1.56 0.88 0.02  1.78 1.34 0.75 0.02 
    Organic 1.60 1.43 0.90 0.06  1.50 1.19 0.79 0.05 
    Inorganic 3.59 3.20 0.89 0.05  1.65 1.61 0.98 0.84 
    Acquired 3.23 2.90 0.90 0.06  1.50 1.46 0.97 0.80 
    Industry 1.67 1.53 0.92 0.13  1.98 1.84 0.93 0.53 
 ∆ Margin 2.27 2.17 0.96 0.46  2.06 1.98 0.96 0.72 
    Alpha 2.38 2.27 0.95 0.41  2.04 1.88 0.92 0.48 
    Acquired 3.18 3.07 0.97 0.56  1.61 1.55 0.97 0.77 
    Industry 2.04 1.96 0.96 0.53  2.34 2.31 0.99 0.90 
 ∆ Revenue 1.67 1.55 0.93 0.21  1.08 1.00 0.92 0.50 
    Alpha 1.99 1.89 0.95 0.40  2.10 1.92 0.92 0.46 
    Acquired 3.19 2.52 0.79 0.00  1.35 1.27 0.94 0.57 
    Industry 1.48 1.40 0.94 0.31  1.65 1.62 0.98 0.88 
The coefficients of variation (CV) have been calculated by dividing standard deviation with the 
mean of a driver’s absolute values to get comparable variations across different drivers. Total 
columns illustrate the CV of each driver across all transactions of full and add-on samples. GP fixed 
columns illustrate CV after controlling for GP fixed effect. Ratios compare the CV values before 
and after controlling GP fixed effect, and thus the lower the ratio, the more a driver’s CV is explained 
by GP. F-test measures the two-tailed probability that differences in standard deviations are not 
significantly different.  
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In both samples and for all value creation drivers, the ratios between CVs before 
and after controlling for GP fixed effect are below one, indicating that variations 
within GPs are smaller than variation in all transactions. For total return, the 
corresponding ratio was 0.93 in full sample and 0.91 in add-on sample, with 
considerably high F-test values of 0.19 and 0.40. Thus, while the CV values of total 
return are low, the relative share of GP fixed effect of total variation seems to be 
significantly larger in some other drivers, indicating a higher dependency on GP 
selection. For capital structure effect, the ratio between total and GP-fixed CV is 
0.91 for full sample and 0.88 in add-on sample, indicating that GPs’ ability to utilize 
higher leverage than market on average is slightly more dependent on GP than 
change in the total investment value. F-test values of 0.10 and 0.26 are also 
significantly lower than corresponding values for change in investment value 
indicating better reliability of the results. The variation in the total effect of 
incremental leverage seems to be even more dependent on GP. Similarly, lower 
ratios and lower F-test values of baseline return indicate that industry leverage 
adjusted return might better explain the skill of GPs.  
 
GPs’ ability to create value through the generation of cash flow also seems to be 
slightly more dependent on GP than total return. In full sample, the ratio was 0.92 
and F-test value 0.17, indicating a little more dependency on GP than in total return. 
In add-on sample, GPs seem to explain more of the variation with a ratio of 0.86 
and F-test value of 0.21. With higher ratios, the sub-drivers of cash flow seem to be 
less persistent than the total effect, and no individual sub-driver seems to explain 
the persistence. 
 
Value creation through multiple growth seems to be the most GP-dependent driver 
in our samples. The ratios are 0.88 in full-sample and 0.75 in add-on sample, while 
F-test value of 0.02 implies high reliability of the result. Thus, variations in the 
contributions of multiple growth are significantly higher within all transactions than 
within the transactions of GPs. A significant amount of the variation occurs due to 
the differences in the average multiple growth contributions of a GP. The organic 
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multiple growth driver also implies persistence, although lower than in total 
multiple growth change. However, the persistence of multiple growth seems to be 
driven by organic multiple driver, indicating a persistent value creation skill. It 
could be argued that GPs aim to grow multiple despite the strategy of the deal – 
unlike some other drivers that might be more dependent on deal strategy – and 
therefore a greater share of the variation in multiple contributions is explained by 
GP.  
 
In addition to the low relative persistence of the margin effect, the variation seems 
to be very little dependent on GP. In both samples, the ratio was 0.96 and F-test 
values were high. Alpha margin driver seems to be a little more GP-dependent 
driver with slightly lower ratios of 0.95 and 0.92. The result indicates that little 
difference exists among the expected variance of GPs’ margin contribution.  
 
The share of the GP fixed effect in the variation of value creation through revenue 
growth is close to the ratio of total return. In full sample the ratio was 0.93 with an 
F-test value of 0.21. In add-on sample, the average persistence was significantly 
higher but still GP fixed effect explained only little of the variation, resulting in a 
ratio of 0.92 with an F-test value of 0.50. In the sub-categories of revenue growth, 
all drivers implied slightly weaker dependency on GP.  
 
The results of table 12 illustrate the average variation in drivers' contribution as well 
as GPs' average dependency on variation. While it gives an idea of the average 
persistence of value creation drivers, it does not reveal the differences between GPs’ 
value creation skills. Furthermore, the low ratios of some drivers indicate that the 
averages between GPs are significant, and thus LPs should pay attention to selecting 
GPs with a high expected value and low variation (high persistence). Thus, in 
addition to considering the variation within a GP in a specific driver, one should 
consider the GP’s average value creation contribution when assessing the 
significance of a value creation driver.  
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4.2.3 Mean contribution and volatility 
The relative importance of a driver and its relevance as a predictive return indicator 
can be seen as a function of expected average return and volatility. In general, risk-
averse LP would prefer a GP that can generate high returns with low volatility. The 
risk appetite of an LP defines how much volatility it can withstand at a given level 
of expected return. Similarly, the higher the average contribution and the lower the 
volatility, the more attractive an individual value creation driver is. Next, we will 
examine the relation between average contribution and standard deviation of 
various levers of alpha across GPs. To anonymize the results, random numbers from 
1 to 35 has been set to represent each GP in our samples. 
 
Total return 
Figure 16 illustrates the mean and standard deviation of total return by GP. The 
graph illustrates how the higher return is positively associated with standard 
deviation on average. For example, GP number 30 has created significantly higher 
average returns than GP number 6 while the volatilities of the returns are roughly 
equal. Thus, GP number 30 seems a more attractive investment target than GP 
number 6 in terms of risk and expected return. In general, GPs below trendlines 
have exhibited high return when compared to the standard deviation of the results 
and seem most attractive investment targets based on historical returns. Attractive 
GPs include for example numbers 12, 25 and 30 in full sample, and numbers 9 and 
20 in add-on sample. On the other hand, risk-averse LP might want to avoid GPs 
generating low returns with high volatility. These GPs include numbers 2 and 7 in 
full sample, and numbers 3 and 10 in add-on sample.  
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Each bubble illustrates the average value creation of an anonymous GP. Bubble area illustrates the 
number of transactions by the given GP. Grey (full sample) and black (add-on sample) trendlines 
represent the average relation between average and standard deviation.  
Figure 16 Mean and standard deviation of total return by GP 
 
Capital structure 
Closer examination of alpha drivers reveals whether specific GPs have the skill to 
create consistently industry outperforming returns with low volatility with a 
specific value creation driver. First, figure 17 represents the value creation through 
capital structure effect by GP, which describes the net effect of GPs’ ability to 
exploit higher leverage than industry peers on average. While previously introduced 
results highlight the relatively high contribution of incremental leverage in value 
creation and the relatively high average persistence when compared to some other 
drivers, figure 14 reveals how significant differences appear between GPs when it 
comes to exploiting high leverage in value creation.  
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Each bubble illustrates the average value creation of an anonymous GP. Bubble area illustrates the 
number of transactions by the given GP. Grey (full sample) and black (add-on sample) trendlines 
represent the average relation between average and standard deviation.  
Figure 17 Mean contribution and standard deviation of capital structure effect by GP 
 
While some GPs seem to have lower leverage than industry on average (especially 
GPs 21 and 31), others have captured significant returns with relatively high 
persistence. For example, GPs 27 and 32 in full sample have been able to generate 
TMs of 2.24 and 3.01 with relatively small standard deviations of 1.57 and 1.90, 
respectively. The result indicates that these GPs have constant access to higher 
leverage than average industry peers, and they are able to turn leverage into value 
with significantly higher persistence than most other GPs. On the other hand, GP 
number 7 has also above average contribution with incremental leverage, but the 
high volatility indicates inconsistent ability to create value, which might be partly 
explained by investments ending up to bankruptcy.  
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Cash flow alpha 
While the average contribution of cash flow alpha was only between 0.08 and 0.18 
and the relative persistence seemed moderate, significant differences in persistence 
occurred between GPs, especially in add-on sample. Figure 15 represent the mean 
contributions and standard deviations of cash flow alpha driver by GP. When it 
comes to generating more cash flow than industry peers on average, the correlation 
between average contribution and standard deviation seems low compared to the 
apparent positive association in other drivers.  
 
 
Each bubble illustrates the average value creation of an anonymous GP. Bubble area illustrates the 
number of transactions by the given GP. Grey (full sample) and black (add-on sample) trendlines 
represent the average relation between average and standard deviation.  
Figure 18 Mean contribution and standard deviation of cash flow alpha by GP 
 
The results of figure 18 indicate that some GPs are able to generate value by higher 
cash flow than industry average and maintain a significantly higher ratio of mean 
contribution and standard deviation than other GPs on average. For example, in 
add-on sample, GPs number 16 and 17 have yielded positive value with incremental 
cash flow while GPs 9 and 10 have had a negative contribution on average with 
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significantly lower persistence. The result indicates that although the average 
contribution of cash flow alpha is relatively small, significant differences appear in 
the differences between GPs to create value and thus such GPs exist that can create 
value more and with higher persistence than average. Furthermore, by avoiding 
worst performing and low persistence GPs, such as GPs number 21 and 22, LPs 
might yield above-average FCF returns in the future.  
 
Multiple alpha 
In previous results, we demonstrated multiple growth to be the most significant 
contributor to baseline return, while organic alpha represented the majority of the 
alpha multiple growth. Furthermore, despite the moderate persistence compared to 
other drivers, the variation was found to be highly dependent on GP, indicating high 
differences in the averages between GPs. Figure 19 demonstrates how the mean 
contributions of organic multiple alpha driver ranged from negative values to 
contributions of over 3 TM.  
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Each bubble illustrates the average value creation of an anonymous GP. Bubble area illustrates the 
number of transactions by the given GP. Grey (full sample) and black (add-on sample) trendlines 
represent the average relation between average and standard deviation.  
Figure 19 Mean contribution and standard deviation of multiple alpha by GP 
 
Despite the positive association between mean contribution and standard deviation, 
some GPs demonstrated a skill of growing multiple with relatively low standard 
deviation. For example, GP number 20 demonstrated more persistent organic 
multiple growth than GP number 3, while the mean contribution remained 
significantly higher. Similarly,a in full sample, GP number 30 yielded an average 
TM of 1.29 by growing multiple faster than industry peers, while GP number 16 
yielded a negative TM of -0.26 with only little higher persistence.  
 
Margin alpha 
According to previously introduced results, the average contribution of margin 
growth was between 0.45 and 0.48. The contribution of alpha margin was even 
greater, suggesting a small negative margin change in industry peers on average. 
However, the persistence turned out to be low and only little of the high volatility 
was explained by GP. Figure 20 illustrates the positive correlation between standard 
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deviation and mean contribution of margin alpha driver by GP. With the exception 
of a few outliers – GPs 8, 14, 15 and 7 – no GP seem to stand out in terms of an 
exceptionally low ratio of mean contribution and standard deviation. Even for the 
GPs yielding highest ratios of mean contribution and standard deviation – such as 
GPs number 18 and 30 – the ratio remains low compared to other drivers. This 
might indicate that despite the majority of margin contribution was allocated to 
alpha, alpha might be captured through indirect effects, such as exploiting 
economies of scale and realizing synergies from add-on acquisitions rather than 
cost-cutting of a GP.  
 
 
Each bubble illustrates the average value creation of an anonymous GP. Bubble area illustrates the 
number of transactions by the given GP. Grey (full sample) and black (add-on sample) trendlines 
represent the average relation between average and standard deviation.  
Figure 20 Mean contribution and standard deviation of margin alpha by GP 
 
Revenue alpha 
Previous results demonstrate the importance of revenue growth in value creation 
but indicate that only little of it is actually captured as alpha of a GP. However, 
when compared to other drivers, total revenue growth seems to be the most 
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persistent of five main drivers while revenue alpha seems less persistent. 
Furthermore, GPs seemed to explain only little of the variation. The results of figure 
21 demonstrate a positive correlation between mean contribution and standard 
deviation. A significant outlier in the sample is GP number 7, whose average 
contribution is negative with remarkably low persistence. The result shows how 
different the value creation strategy of GP number 7 has been from the other GPs, 
who in turn yielded significantly higher returns by growing margin (see figure 20). 
 
 
Each bubble illustrates the average value creation of an anonymous GP. Bubble area illustrates the 
number of transactions by the given GP. Grey (full sample) and black (add-on sample) trendlines 
represent the average relation between average and standard deviation.  
Figure 21 Mean contribution and standard deviation of revenue alpha by GP 
 
The results suggest that some GPs have demonstrated highly persistent value 
creation through alpha revenue growth. For example, GP number 25 has yielded 
mean contribution of 1.12 with a standard deviation of 1.06. Furthermore, for 
example, GP number 10 yielded significantly higher returns than GP number 9 with 
significantly higher persistence. Thus, the results indicate that organic growth of 
revenue can also be a relatively persistent driver.  
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The results of this chapter have demonstrated that while the coefficient of variation 
was higher for individual value creation drivers than for total return, the 
examination of the mean contribution and standard deviation between different 
value creation drivers and GPs reveal significant differences in value creation. 
Some GPs are able to create higher mean returns with a specific driver than others 
while maintaining relatively high persistence. Furthermore, in addition to individual 
drivers, the inspection of the graphs represented in this chapter reveals the different 
patterns of value creation across GPs.  
 
For example, 99% ((1.18+1.90)/3.10) of the value creation of GP number 7 was 
attributable to alpha margin growth and capital structure leaving a very little 
contribution to other drivers. On the other hand, GP number 9 executed numerous 
add-on acquisitions and realized majority of value through revenue growth and 
alpha margin growth, most of which was likely captured as cost synergies. 
However, the average industry leverage of GP number 9 resulted in a lower total 
return than GP number 7, but with significantly higher persistence.   
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.1 Discussion of the results 
The purpose of this study was to improve understanding of value creation in PE as 
well as to examine the skills of GPs to create persistent value with particular value 
creation drivers. A large deal-level dataset of PE transactions executed between 
1990 and 2015 was used to examine value creation attribution. To quantify the 
contributions of various sources and causes of value creation, we were the first to 
apply the IVC 2.0 framework with a large deal-level dataset. Especially, we 
contributed to the research on PE value creation in small- and mid-cap transactions 
in Europe. Full sample (n=297) and add-on sample (n=75) was used to exploit both 
large and more accurate datasets.  
5.1.1 Value creation 
The results indicate that GPs’ ability to use higher leverage than the market on 
average represents the greatest individual driver of value creation and the largest 
contributor to public market outperformance.  The contributions were 40% and 24% 
in the two samples, which are in line with most previous studies suggesting that 
incremental leverage represents around a third of value creation (Achleitner et al. 
2011, Kaserer 2011, Puche et al. 2015, Ernst & Young 2014). However, due to 
methodological differences, our results are not fully comparable with previous 
studies.  
 
For industry leverage adjusted return, valuation multiple growth is the most 
significant driver and largest individual driver explaining public market 
outperformance. The contribution of multiple growth was 22% and 31% in the two 
samples, while add-ons acquired by a lower multiple than portfolio company caused 
an additional contribution of -3% in add-on sample. The findings thus suggest a 
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more significant role for multiple expansion in value creation than the previous 
studies, which have found smaller and highly varying results ranging from 
contributions of -10 to 20% (Guo et al. 2011, Kaserer 2011, Puche et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, according to our results, roughly a third of organic multiple expansion 
is achieved by exploiting multiple arbitrage resulting from the integration of add-
on targets as part of the portfolio company’s platform. The significant contribution 
of organic multiple growth indicates that GPs are either able to negotiate lower 
entry prices or higher exit prices than industry peers. Higher exit multiples can also 
be a result of selecting the most potential exit route at each economic situation, such 
as a sell to a strategic buyer (Gompers et al. 2016). As a consequence of increasing 
company sizes on average, organic multiple growth is also likely to be an indirect 
consequence of revenue growth – both organic and inorganic – which is found to 
be positively correlated to exit multiple (Achleitner et al. 2011).  
 
Previous studies have highlighted the increasingly important role of operational 
improvements in value creation and found total contributions of operational 
improvements to range from 50 to 75% (Kaserer 2011, Graf et al. 2012, Gompers 
et al. 2016, Puche et al. 2015). In our samples, operational improvements averaged 
a significant contribution of 37 to 45%, which, however, was considerably lower 
than previous studies have demonstrated.  
 
Within operational improvement drivers, organic revenue growth represented the 
most important driver with a contribution of around 20% in both samples, which is 
significantly lower than 30 to 40% suggested by previous studies (Kaserer 2011, 
Puche et al. 2015). However, the acquired revenue contribution of 18% in add-on 
sample raised the total contribution of revenue growth to the level of previous 
findings. Since around a half of revenue growth is actually acquired on average, the 
role of organic revenue growth seems significantly smaller than previous studies 
suggest. Furthermore, since GPs acquire targets from growing industries on 
average, only 28% of total revenue growth contribution is allocated to alpha, and 
thus the role of revenue growth seems to be relatively small when it comes to 
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outperformance over public market peers. Our results are supported by the findings 
of Söffge and Braun (2018) who find revenue growth to be a significant driver only 
in organic deals, which represented roughly a third of our add-on sample. 
 
While previous studies have suggested that GPs rather focus on revenue growth 
than margin improvement, our results suggest a roughly equal contribution to value 
creation. We found margin effect to have average contributions of 14% and 18%, 
while the corresponding contribution ranged from 7 to 17% in the studies of Kaserer 
(2011) and Puche et al. (2015). Furthermore, since industry margin improvements 
were negative on average, the contributions of margin alpha were 20% of total value 
creation, representing a significantly higher role in outperforming value generation 
than revenue growth. Although add-on targets did not improve the profitability of 
platforms at the time of acquisitions on average, it is likely that significant part of 
alpha margin was captured through economies of scale and realization of synergies 
resulting from add-on acquisitions during holding periods.  
 
In our results, the role of FCF in value creation was significantly lower than in 
previous studies. While Kaserer (2011) found an average contribution of 27% and 
Puche et al. (2015) a contribution of 12%, the average contributions in our samples 
were only 3% and 8%. Similarly, when it comes to creating alpha performance, the 
contribution was only 7% in add-on sample, representing a considerably minor role 
in outperformance. However, to some extent, the differences between our results 
and previous studies are explained by the lack of dividend information in our data. 
Thus, our results are less reliable when it comes to the generation of FCF during 
the holding period.  
 
Although alpha captures the GPs’ outperformance over public peers in various 
value creation levers, it cannot be seen only as a skill of GPs to create value. GPs 
are likely to acquire companies with above-average past performance, which can 
be expected to result in outperformance during holding period without the 
contribution of GP on average. Therefore, in addition to GPs’ abilities to improve 
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the operational performance of portfolio companies, alpha can be seen as GPs’ 
ability to select targets that outperform peers both in the past and likely also during 
PE ownership. Similarly, industry drivers can be seen both as industry benchmark 
returns and as GPs’ ability to select growing industries. 
5.1.2 Persistence 
In addition to studying the contributions of various value creation drivers, we were 
the first to study the persistence of value creation sources and causes. We found 
total return and industry leverage adjusted baseline return to be the most persistent 
drivers of value creation when using the coefficient of variation (CV) as the 
measure of persistence. However, the volatilities of total returns in the two samples 
were little dependent on GPs’ fixed effect, while more significant differences 
between GPs were found in some other drivers of value creation.  
 
In addition to the significant contribution to value creation, GPs’ ability to exploit 
higher leverage than industry peers represented one of the most persistent drivers 
on average. Especially for some individual GPs, incremental leverage yielded more 
persistent value than total return, representing a persistent source of value. Our 
results thus suggest that the ability to inflate returns with high leverage can be a 
persistent source of value for certain GPs, which LPs should consider as a GPs’ 
potential to create value also in the future.  
 
Multiple expansion represented roughly as persistent value creation as leverage 
effect on average, but it was significantly more dependent on GP. We found that a 
significant part of the volatility in multiple driver was explained by the differences 
between GPs rather than volatile contributions within GPs. Furthermore, multiple 
persistence was found to be driven by organic multiple growth which indicates that 
persistence is not driven by different market conditions between GPs or multiple 
arbitrage resulting from add-ons. Thus, the results indicate that certain GPs have a 
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persistent skill to negotiate lower entry multiples or higher exit multiples than 
others. However, since significant differences exist between GPs, LPs should pay 
attention to selecting GPs that have demonstrated consistent multiple growth in the 
past. 
 
Despite the relatively low contribution of alpha revenue growth in value creation, 
total revenue growth driver represented the most persistent value creation in our 
results. However, the sub-drivers of revenue growth indicate that persistence yields 
from acquired growth and growing industry rather than alpha. Furthermore, little of 
the volatilities in revenue drivers is explained by the differences between GPs. Our 
results thus indicate that GPs’ role in organic revenue growth seems to be small and 
only a few GPs seem to stand out in terms of a skill to grow revenue organically.  
 
While margin growth – and especially alpha margin – represented a significant role 
in value creation, margin growth seems to be the least persistent value creation 
driver. In addition to the low persistence, very little of the high variation seemed to 
be explained by GP. The results indicate that GPs’ ability to improve profitability, 
exploit economies of scale and realize synergies create significant value on average, 
but the value creation is highly volatile. Thus, although a GP would have 
demonstrated margin growth in the past, it might still be a poor indicator of future 
profitability improvements.  
 
The generation of FCF represented a small role in value creation, but it seems to be 
a reasonably persistent value creation driver. Persistence was driven by alpha FCF 
driver and GPs explained some of the variations, indicating that some GPs can 
create more persistent value than others. However, the lack of dividend information 
prevents us from making solid conclusions about the persistence of FCF generation.  
 
Since GPs are likely to exploit various strategies in the case of different portfolio 
companies, some of the low persistence can be explained by the divergent value 
creation focuses of a GP’s transactions. For example, a GP could focus on rapid 
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growth in one transaction, while in other the focus can be in profitability 
improvements. This could also explain why our results found total return to be more 
persistent than the individual drivers. On the other hand, one could argue that GPs 
aim to maximize multiple growth despite the deal strategy, which might explain the 
higher persistence of that driver.  
 
Although our results focused on the average contribution and persistence of 
different value creation drivers, significant differences exist between both value 
creation patterns and persistence of different GPs. For example, some GPs exploited 
consistently high leverage to inflate equity returns, while others used little leverage 
and focused on value creation through operational improvements during the holding 
period. Others, in turn, demonstrated a highly persistent skill of acquiring 
companies as a part of platforms and creating value through profitability 
improvements and multiple growth. Therefore, we suggest that LPs should examine 
the past value creation and persistence of potential GPs parallel with the qualitative 
analysis of GP’s investment strategy to evaluate the GP’s ability to create value in 
the future.  
5.2 Limitations 
This thesis focused on mid- and large-cap buyout deals in European region between 
years 1990 and 2015. Thus, our samples offer a view of the value creation and 
persistence of a relatively small deal sample during that period. Although most of 
our results have not been studied at the level of detail we offered, the differences to 
comparable results in previous literature can be explained to some extent with the 
focus of our sample. For example, the higher bankruptcy risk of smaller companies 
may lead to higher multiple growth and lower leverage effect than suggested by 
previous research.  
 
Perhaps the most severe limitations of this study relate to the quality of data. The 
transaction data was originally collected from fund managers, and thus individual 
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managers might have different entry practices when it comes to for example 
exchange rates and acquired values. The most severe shortcoming of the data was 
the lack of dividend information, which can be a significant source of value. This 
effected especially to the results of value creation and persistence of cash flow.  
 
Furthermore, some assumptions had to made due to missing data. In transaction 
values, we assumed that net debt equals debt to get leverage ratio values at entry. 
Interest and tax rates were also collected from external sources using company 
headquarters and time as the criteria. The actual contribution of incremental debt 
and tax shield could thus be significantly different from our results in practice, and 
this is also why they had a small focus in this thesis.  
5.3 Suggestions for future research 
Despite the highly informative results of the IVC 2.0 framework, the manner in 
which intrinsic and extrinsic value creation are separated could be enhanced. The 
components of alpha can be seen as a GP’s skill to select outperforming targets, an 
indirect effect of add-on acquisitions and actual contribution of the portfolio 
company and GP to value creation. Thus, it can not be seen only as the contribution 
of GP, which blurs the view of GPs value creation to some extent. However, more 
detailed data is needed to better separate the intrinsic and extrinsic causes of value 
creation as suggested by Berg and Gottschalg (2005).  
 
Competition has been found to be a significant performance driver in the PE sector 
(Braun et al. 2017b), but we did not examine the results based on competitive 
situation or timing. Since performance persistence has vanished to some extent as 
the consequence of increased competition, future scholars could examine how the 
relative contribution and persistence of value creation drivers vary in different 
competitive situations and throughout time. While this thesis focused on the 
persistence of alpha drivers, it would also be interesting to study the persistence of 
industry drivers to capture whether specific GP’s are able to consistently select 
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value-creating industries. Furthermore, since GPs’ varying value creation strategies 
might explain some of the low persistence in our results, it would be interesting to 
group transactions based on deal strategy and examine the value creation patterns 
and returns of various strategies as well as the ability of specific GPs to execute 
these strategies successfully.  
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